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PREFACE
Finland has a pension system that, in a unique way, combines a compulsory 
legislative basis, similar benefits for all, partial funding and private organization 
of the pension provision. It is a hybrid, fulfilling the functions of first and 
second pillar pensions within the same scheme. The main pension scheme is a 
legislated and compulsory earnings-related scheme, which is supplemented by 
the residence-based, flat-rate pension scheme. 
In order to get a fresh international view of the Finnish pension system, the 
Finnish Centre for Pensions decided in 2011 to commission an independent 
evaluation study of the Finnish pension scheme. The purpose of the evaluation 
was to get a forward-looking external view of the Finnish pension system from 
an international perspective, including recommendations. 
The evaluation focuses on the following issues:
1. The adequacy of pensions and the financial sustainability of the system:
•	 the roles of the earnings-related pension and the residence-based flat-
rate pension, and the interplay of these
•	 the functioning of the economic and actuarial incentives of the pension 
system.
2. The policy design of the Finnish earnings-related pension scheme:
•	 how does the Finnish pension system look from the point of view of 
risk-sharing and social insurance? 
•	 the impact of the pension system on the economy, the labour markets 
(incentives to work and to retire), and society in general
•	 the roles of the state, labour market organizations and other interest 
groups in the decision-making (pension legislation).
3. Governance issues in the earnings-related pension scheme:
•	 the functioning of the organization of pension provision (the roles 
and relations of various actors in pension provision, including the 
administrative structures of these organizations)
•	 the roles of co-operation and competition between pension providers 
•	 the administrative efficiency and cost-efficiency of the earnings-related 
pension system. 
We were very lucky that two distinguished experts agreed to undertake this 
ambitious task. Professor Nicholas Barr from the London School of Economics 
agreed to evaluate the first two sets of issues outlined above (adequacy and 
sustainability issues and policy design), and Professor Keith Ambachtsheer, 
who is Director of the Rotman International Centre for Pension Management, 
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, to evaluate the 
governance issues. Both Barr and Ambachtsheer are internationally well-
known and highly regarded experts in the pension field, and their services are 
frequently utilized internationally. 
These two evaluations are the first ones of their kind made of the Finnish 
pension system. They comprise sharp analyses, which deserve broad attention 
in the public debate as well as among politicians and decision-makers. They 
emphasize that Finland has a pension system with many strengths deserving 
appreciation. They also provide suggestions for possibly making the system 
even better. The Finnish Centre for Pensions wishes to extend very warm thanks 
to Keith Ambachtsheer and Nicholas Barr for accepting our invitation, and 
for having provided thoughtful and fresh ideas to fertilize the pension policy 
discussion in Finland.
In connection with the evaluation reports by Keith Ambachtsheer and 
Nicholas Barr, three background papers will also be published. The key results 
of these three studies are utilized in Ambachtsheer’s evaluation, and we wanted 
to make the results of the studies available in greater detail and hence decided 
to publish them. 
Two of the studies are based on reports provided by CEM Benchmarking 
Inc. CEM is specialized in providing benchmarking information for pension 
investment and administration operations. Its clients are pension providers 
all over the world, who want to benchmark their own performance to the best 
pension providers in the world. The Finnish Centre for Pensions asked CEM to 
conduct a comparison of the Finnish pension providers with pension providers 
using CEM’s databases and services. These studies focus on administrative costs 
and service levels, as well as investment costs. 
We wish to thank Mike Heale from CEM Benchmarking Inc. for managing 
this assignment for us with high professional expertise. Eight Finnish pension 
providers participated in these studies, and we wish to thank them for being 
part of the project. 
In CEM’s analysis, eight Finnish pension providers were combined into 
a single entity, ’the Finnish Pension Fund’, which is compared to individual 
pension providers. This analysis gives insight into the costs and service levels 
in Finland compared with those of the peer group chosen from the database 
of CEM. The report is not meant to describe the costs at the national level, 
including all first and second pillar pension providers. In order to achieve this 
broader view, the Finnish Centre for Pensions conducted a comparative study 
of the administrative costs of first and second pillar pensions in Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. This 
study, based mainly on publicly available information, was carried out by Antti 
Mielonen, Eeva Puuperä, Hannu Ramberg and Mika Vidlund from the Finnish 
Centre for Pensions. We wish to thank them for this essential contribution to 
the evaluation.
Jukka Rantala
Managing Director
Hannu Uusitalo
Director, Professor
 
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This past January I was invited by The Finnish Centre for Pensions to undertake 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of the institutional structure and governance 
of Finland’s pension institutions. This was to be a companion study to that of 
Prof. Nicholas Barr of the London School of Economics, who was invited to do 
a similar evaluation of the broader design elements of Finland’s pension system 
as a whole. Institutional elements I was asked to evaluate in this study include 
the following:
•	 The design of the institutional structure of Finland’s pension system
•	 The roles of co-operation and competition between pension services 
providers
•	 The governance structures and decision-making processes of Finnish 
pension institutions
•	 The cost-effectiveness of their investment and benefit administration 
functions.
Based on my findings, I was asked to make recommendations that could 
improve the organizational performance of Finnish pension institutions.
The resulting findings and related recommendations are set out in this 
Report. I would like to acknowledge and thank the many people who were 
helpful to me in the conduct of this study. Many gave unselfishly of their time 
in answering my questions, and pointed me to studies which turned out to be 
valuable in carrying out this assignment. There are far too many to acknowledge 
individually. I would, however, single out Mr. Jukka Rantala and Mr. Hannu 
Uusitalo at The Finnish Centre for Pensions for responding unfailingly to 
my seemingly never-ending series of questions and requests for assistance of 
various kinds. I would especially like to thank them for organizing 16 face-
to-face meetings involving 28 knowledgeable people in Helsinki at the end of 
September.1 This study simply could not have been conducted without their 
energetic support.
Keith Ambachtsheer
1 The participants in these discussions are listed in Appendix 1.
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REPORT STRUCTURE
This Report is organized around four broad questions:
1. What is the institutional structure of Finland’s employment-based pension 
system, how does it compare with other countries’ systems, and how well 
do Finland’s pension institutions contribute to the financial security of its 
citizens?
2. Using global benchmarks provided by CEM Benchmarking Inc., do 
Finland’s pension institutions produce ’value for money’ in their investment 
and benefit administration functions?
3. Using deductive reasoning and empirical investigations, what do ’ideal’ 
pension institutions look like from their governance and organization design 
perspectives, and how do actual Finnish pension institutions measure up to 
those ’ideals’?
4. What ties do Finnish pension institutions have to Finland’s corporate and 
financial sectors, and what can be said about these ties?
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SECTION I
Report summary, conclusions and recommendations
Finland’s retirement income system is both comprehensive and robust. Its design 
is consensus-driven, covers the entire workforce, provides adequate pensions, 
facilitates worker mobility, and is institutionally robust. On the latter point, its 
institutions have clearly-defined roles, structures, and governance processes. 
The various components of the pension system are better integrated than in 
most other countries. It would continue to serve Finnish citizens well into the 
future even if nothing was changed. However, in my view, the employment-
based part of the system could be made even more effective if initiatives were 
taken to simplify it, to make it more cost-effective, and to refocus the purpose 
of the some 150 billion Euros of Finnish pension assets. These initiatives 
would address four issues: 1. How the system is financed, 2. How its pension 
institutions are structured, 3. How those institutions are governed, and 4. The 
relative emphasis on investment opportunities outside versus inside Finland. 
Financing Finnish pensions
Finnish pensions are partially financed (about 75%) by pay-go contributions, 
and partially by pre-funding (about 25%) contributions. The former flow 
through directly into pension payments; the latter are invested now, and paid 
out as pensions later. This structure raises important questions:
•	 Why and how should the current 75–25 ratio change over time? For 
example, should ratio changes be decided through ad hoc consensual 
decision processes involving Finland’s major stakeholder groups as has been 
the case in the past, or should future changes be back-stopped by agreed-
on, automatic decision-rules that take into account such factors as changing 
economic prospects and demographics?
•	 For example, the Finnish Centre for Pensions projects that at current pension 
benefit levels, today’s 22.8 per cent contribution rate must rise significantly 
over the next 20 years to reflect the aging of Finland’s population. Unless 
pre-empted by other over-riding decisions, should the current situation 
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not automatically lead to a higher proportion of pre-funding now to reflect 
intergenerational fairness in the future?
In managing the pension assets resulting from prefunding, Finland’s Pension 
Insurance Companies (PICs) are subject to strict solvency rules to assure ability 
to pay. Arguably, some features of these rules are open to question. For example, 
the discount rate used in the solvency calculations is decided through ad hoc 
consensual decision processes rather than automatically determined by market 
developments. Once again, this raises important questions:
•	 Do the PICs really have 20 per cent solvency margins today based on a 
consensus-determined 3 per cent discount rate when the market-based 
discount rate today is more like 2.5 per cent?
•	 Do 100 per cent of prefunded pensions have to be guaranteed within the 
PICs? Or, for example, is it more realistic to invest pre-funding contributions 
into more long-horizon, return-seeking investment strategies than is 
currently the case…and then gradually convert the asset accumulations into 
guarantees for older workers and retirees?
•	 Or alternatively, does an integrated national retirement income system with 
effectively a single benefit design and a current 75–25 pay-go/pre-funded 
ratio need PIC solvency requirements at all? In the end, payment certainty 
depends on the health of the Finnish economy, and on the size and wealth-
creation capability of the aggregate pre-funded asset buffer fund (about 
150B Euros today).
These are not just theoretically interesting questions. For example, assigning a 
return-seeking mandate to the entire 150 billion Euro asset buffer fund (rather 
than to just part of it) could reorient its current solvency-driven ’short-termism’ 
and arguably increase its expected return by 1 per cent/year, or 1.5B Euros/year 
in a country with a 190B Euro GDP economy. 
Institutional structure and cost-effectiveness
The Finnish retirement income system costs over 1B Euros per annum to 
operate today (over 600M Euros on the asset side, and over 400M Euros on the 
benefit administration side).
Studies carried out by CEM Benchmarking Inc. on the aggregate cost-
effectiveness performance of 8 major Finnish pension organizations provided 
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the following information about the investment management and benefit 
administration sides of the Finnish retirement income system:
•	 Finnish pension organizations outsource a significantly smaller proportion 
(average 35%) of the asset management function than do their international 
peers in the CEM database (average 88%). This choice reduces the overall 
cost of the Finnish asset management function considerably. However, that 
cost advantage is lost by paying higher fees for similar external services. So 
on the whole, total Finnish asset management costs of about ½ per cent of 
assets per annum matched those of the international peer group average. 
•	 The CEM study indicated that the bulk of the estimated annual 537M Euros 
paid to external managers in fees in 2011 relate to private markets and hedge 
fund investment fees (some 400M Euros).
•	 Finnish pension organizations currently spend materially less money on 
the Internal Investment Oversight function than their international peers. 
These lower levels of spending also show up in the compensation of senior 
Finnish pension fund executives. Their average 244,000 Euros in total 
annual compensation ranks well below that of their international peers. 
These findings contradict the views of some observers who believe Finnish 
pension executives are over-compensated. 
•	 In the investment return side, Finnish funds would have held their own 
against their international peers over 2007–2011, except for one thing: their 
17 per cent exposure to Finnish equities at the start of the measurement 
period. This exposure cost Finnish funds, on average, a material 1.5 per 
cent/year in underperformance relative to their international peers over this 
five-year period.
•	 Estimated total benefit administration costs for Finnish pension 
organizations amounted to some 440M Euros in 2011. This implies an 
average 107 Euros/participant, compared to an average 60 Euros/participant 
for an international peer group. This material cost differential was estimated 
to be due to three factors: 1. The smaller size of the Finnish organizations 
(63% or 30 Euros), 2. The greater complexity of benefit administration in 
Finland (23% or 11 Euros), 3. Other factors such as marketing and sales 
costs, and maintaining the cross-insurance feature of the Finnish PICs (14% 
or 6 Euros).
•	 An important mitigating factor in assessing this cost performance is that in 
the case of Finland, the pension administration costs cover both pension 
Pillar 1 and 2 expenses. In most other countries, Pillar 1 (universal old-
age pensions) and Pillar 2 (employment-based pensions) are administered 
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separately. The combined Pillar 1 and 2 unit costs in most other countries 
likely surpass those of Finland at the national level. 
•	 On the member service ranking side, the Finnish organizations scored an 
average 70 versus 75 for the international peer group. CEM noted that the 
PICs devote considerably greater resources to servicing their employer-
clients, likely due to the competitive element in the Finnish pensions market.
These findings point to the advantages of attaining scale in both asset 
management and benefit administration functions. On the asset management 
side, greater scale creates greater opportunities for in-sourcing investment 
mandates, especially in the high-cost private markets areas (e.g., private equity, 
real estate, and infrastructure). Such in-sourcing strategies could easily cut 
the estimated 537M Euro Finnish pension organizations spent on external 
investment fees in 2011 in half.
Greater scale also permits organizations to build more robust internal 
oversight functions. These functions are critically important in such areas as 
governance, strategic and risk management, and investment management. On 
the benefit administration side, greater scale drives down unit costs in such 
areas as member contacts, member statements, pension inceptions, websites, 
and member counselling. 
It is not the mandate of this Report to propose specific strategies for how 
scale can be increased in the Finnish investment management and benefit 
administration functions. However, in my view, there is strong evidence that 
well-managed ’scaling up’ strategies carry opportunities for both greater value-
creation and lower operating costs in both the investment and administration 
spheres of Finland’s pension system. A combined value-creation/cost reduction 
target in the 400 million Euros range is not unrealistic. This 400M Euros/yr 
in potential value-creation/cost reductions plus the 1.5B Euro/yr incremental 
return potential by moving the 150B Euros in Finnish pension assets into long-
horizon return-seeking investment strategies is equivalent to a potential 1 per 
cent gain in Finland’s GDP.
What about the value of creating a competitive environment between the 
PICs? Does it not raise service quality while keeping a lid on prices? In my 
view, there is no compelling evidence this is the case. On the investment side, 
logic and evidence suggests ’competition’ creates longer term herding behavior 
between the competitors rather than superior investment returns. On the 
administration side, the PIC competition focus is predictably on employer-
clients, as it is this group who make the ’hire-fire’ decisions. The average PIC 
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ranking for member services of 70 versus 75 for the international peer group 
does not confirm Finnish employees and retirees have benefited from PIC 
competition.
Institutional governance
Finland has developed a detailed protocol for the governance and management 
of its pension institutions. However, as in other countries around the world, 
there is evidence of a gap between aspiration and reality. ’Stakeholder group 
representation’, while important, should not outrank requisite skill and 
experience in the selection criteria for board members of pension organizations. 
Both criteria are important. 
Fortunately, there are strategies that can address the ’representation vs. skill/
experience’ imbalance problem. The first step is for employer and employee 
groups to agree that the problem exists, and that the solution lies in raising the 
bar on requisite board skill and experience while maintaining the legitimate 
need for all stakeholder groups to feel their interests are well-represented.
From looking inward to looking outward
The financial and economic connections between Finland’s pension system and 
its economy has historically been very close. In the last 10–15 years Finnish 
pension assets have been increasingly invested outside the country. However, 
even today approximately 1/3rd continues to be invested inside Finland. 
This is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides presumably 
knowledgeable capital inside a relatively small country by global standards. On 
the other, as the 2007–2011 experience cited above confirms, there is a ’double 
jeopardy’ dimension to it. Because of its 75 per cent ’pay-go’ financing, the 
health of the Finnish pension system is already heavily dependent on the health 
of the Finnish economy. This suggests its financial asset buffer should be fully 
invested outside Finland as a diversification strategy. 
A more vigorous outward-looking approach to investing Finnish pension 
assets would also help defuse the ongoing perceptions in some quarters that 
(a) there is a continued risk of political interference in how Finland’s pension 
assets are invested domestically, and (b) that the Finnish corporate and pension 
sectors are still not ’arms-length’ enough. Finally, a higher level of collaboration 
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with leading pension organizations in other countries will uncover new 
investment ideas and opportunities for Finnish pension organizations.    
In conclusion
We repeat our initial observation that Finland’s retirement income system 
is both comprehensive and institutionally robust. It would continue to serve 
Finnish citizens well into the future even if nothing was changed. However, 
there are opportunities to simplify the system, to improve governance quality, 
to explore global investment opportunities, and in the process, to materially 
raise asset returns and lower investment and benefit administration costs. I 
encourage Finnish policy makers to carefully assess these opportunities, and to 
capitalize on them to the degree practically possible. Specifically, I recommend 
the following six questions be addressed:
1. Adjust retirement income system financing strategies?
2. Rethink role of pension assets and implications for investment policies?
3. Exploit significant ’economies of scale’ opportunities in investments and 
benefit administration?
4. Shift incentive structures in pension system from competition to 
collaboration basis?
5. Raise governance quality by combining representation and skills/experience 
requirements?
6. Accelerate ’looking outward’ momentum in pension asset management?
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SECTION II
The institutional structure of Finland’s pension system 
and its contribution to Finnish financial security: how 
well does it work?
A unique institutional structure
The institutional structure of any country’s pension system is unique to that 
country, having evolved out of a series of circumstances, events, and the 
responses to them over many decades. Finland’s pension system is no exception 
to that general rule. Briefly:
•	 In a design spectrum ranging from ’voluntary/fragmented’ at one end to 
’mandatory/collective’ at the other, Finland’s pension system is distinctly 
’mandatory/collective’, with a small number of pension arrangements and 
institutions effectively covering Finland’s entire population.
•	 Organizations representing the country’s employer and employee 
communities have played leading roles in the design of Finland’s pension 
system and its evolution over time. Government has played a supporting 
role through passing pension legislation reflecting employer-employee 
preferences and decisions. The Finnish Centre for Pensions acts as the 
country’s key pension R&D arm, facilitating ongoing research, debate, and 
discussion on pension system improvement. This collective, consensus-
oriented approach has helped Finland maintain its position as one of the 
globe’s thought-leaders in pension design and delivery.
•	 A key Finnish system design decision was to segment pension and related 
benefit financing into pay-go (about 75%) and prefunded (about 25%) 
components. Arguably, this is a middle road between fully pay-go and fully 
prefunded finance designs, each with its own pros and cons. The current 
75/25 proportions raise an interesting question: is there an optimal pay-go/
prefunded ratio for a country that maximizes sustainable benefit security? If 
so, what are the determinants of this ’optimality’, and how might the answer 
change over time in response to changing demographic and economic 
factors?2
2  I pursue these questions in more detail later in the Report.
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•	 The mandatory/collective philosophy of the Finnish system is reflected in 
its institutional structure, with 37 not-for-profit organizations currently 
licensed to provide insurance, investment, and benefit administration 
services to pension plan participants and their employers.
•	 However, there is significant institutional concentration. For example, 4 
of the 37 private and public sector pension service providers managed a 
collective 103B Euros of pension assets at the end of 2011, out of a national 
total of 144B Euros (i.e., 72%).
•	 The bulk of the pension arrangements for private sector workers and 
employers are managed through 7 pension insurance companies (PICs). 
While PICs are not-for-profit entities, they do compete for market share 
based on service levels and profitability. Of the 7 companies, 2 have 
dominant market positions. For example, at the end of 2011, Varma and 
Ilmarinen managed 59B Euros out of a total PIC asset base of 83B. (i.e., over 
70%).
•	 While PIC investment policies are not identical, asset mixes tend to be 
middle-of-the-road with about 40 per cent allocated to equities, 45 per cent 
to debt instruments, 10 per cent to real estate, and 5 per cent to alternatives 
such as hedge funds. Geographically, investments split roughly equally 
between Finland, Europe, and Rest of World. On a global asset capitalization 
basis, this implies significant home-country and Euro biases. 
•	 Unlike Defined Benefit (DB) pension arrangements in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, PIC solvency is regulated using insurance company principles. 
Specifically, Finland’s insurance regulator requires that each PIC has a 
solvency margin sufficiently large to withstand shocks such as the 2008–2009 
Global Financial Crisis. Further, if a PIC becomes insolvent, the remaining 
PICs are collectively obligated to cover its liabilities.3
•	 Specific views expressed by Finnish experts in the 16 Helsinki meetings in 
September are listed below. They should be read in the constructive context 
of people wanting to improve a system they deemed to be already broadly 
functional and effective: 
 – Most Finns don’t understand the complexities of their pension system, 
but have a high level of trust in it.
3 As a counter example, American state and local retirement systems are not regulated at all. As a 
consequence, the average funded ratio of these plans is about 75 per cent today versus a target 100 
per cent despite the use of aggressive liability discount rates in the 7–8 per cent range. In contrast, 
Finland’s reported PIC funded ratios average about 120 per cent today with a far more conservative 
liability discount rate of 3 per cent. These solvency measurement and management questions are 
further explored later in the Report. 
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 – The intergenerational fairness issue should receive more attention, and 
there should be more openness to greater flexibility in benefit levels and 
retirement age.
 – The PIC solvency rules, and their quarterly reporting, create herding 
behavior and leave too little room for long horizon investing with higher 
return prospects.
 – Pension fund Boards are too big (e.g., 12 people and 4 alternates) and 
have too little genuine governance expertise.
 – The concept of PIC competition-based client rebates is not well-
conceived. 
 – PIC investment policies are too Finland-oriented, especially since the 
75 per cent Pay-Go component of the pension system is already fully 
dependent on the health of the Finnish economy, the potential size of its 
labour pool, and the participation rate of that pool in the labour market.
This institutional summary leads to a number of conclusions and questions that 
require further exploration.
Resulting conclusions and questions for further exploration
Specifically, the following come to mind:
1. On the whole, the institutional structure of Finland’s pension system, while 
complex, is one of the most robust in the world (e.g., see footnote 3 below 
on the fiscal situation of US state in local retirement systems). A question for 
exploration: can the Finnish system be simplified, made more cost-effective, 
and stay robust at the same time?
2. The pay-go/prefunded financing ratio is a key policy lever in the Finnish 
system. Developing dynamic/automatic decision rules for why and how that 
ratio should be adjusted over time would represent an important pension 
policy innovation for Finland.4
4 The Finnish Centre for Pensions estimates that at current benefit levels, today’s contribution rate 
of 22.8 per cent for earnings-related pensions must rise by a material amount over the next 20 years 
to reflect the aging of Finland’s population. Arguably, it would be fairer to the next generation of 
workers to prefund a higher proportion of future benefits by raising the contribution rate more rapidly 
to a ’steady state’ rate now. Canada made this decision in 1997 with its Canada Pension Plan (CPP) 
by raising the CPP contribution rate from approximately 5 per cent to 10 per cent of pay over a 5-year 
period. The sustainability of the 10 per cent rate (9.9% actually) is now subject to automatic 3-year 
reviews.
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3. There is significant institutional concentration in Finnish pension 
management and delivery. Is this a good system feature or a problem? The 
Report revisits this question in Section III.
4. There is a significant Finland/Euro bias in the investment policies of most 
Finnish pension institutions. Is this bias justified or a problem? The Report 
revisits this and other investment policy questions in Sections III and IV.
5. Given the regulatory application of insurance company principles, how 
effectively are the PICs managing their balance sheet risk? What are the 
prospects for taking PIC solvency risk management to a higher level? 
Or more radically, should the investment policies of the PICs (and other 
Finnish pension funds for that matter), be constrained by solvency rules at 
all?
6. Where do ’competition’ and ’co-operation’ between PICs fit into all this?
An assessment of the three questions in Point 5, and possible responses to them, 
follow below. Then we address Point 6.
The essence of PIC solvency risk management 
While actuarial terminology and methods employed to assess and manage 
balance sheet solvency in organizations like Finland’s PICs often sound arcane 
and complicated, the underlying principles are actually simple and intuitive. 
The key is to understand how the values of future payment promises (i.e., 
balance sheet liabilities) should be calculated today. For example, assume a PIC 
promises to pay 103 Euros one year hence, and that the current yield on 1-year 
duration risk-free bonds is 3 per cent. As a result, the future payment promise 
of 103 Euros has a present value of 100 Euros today, and can be perfectly hedged 
by the purchase of a 100 Euro risk-free bond that will pay 103 Euros one year 
from now. In PIC balance sheet terms, there is a perfect balance today: the 100 
Euro liability is matched by a 100 Euro asset. One will exactly extinguish the 
other one year from now.
What if the payment promise was 101 Euros in one year plus the 1-year rate 
of inflation? Now the 3 per cent risk-free bond would only be the matching asset 
if the inflation rate happened to be 2 per cent. The perfect matching asset would 
now be a risk-free bond that paid 101 Euros in one year plus the 1-year rate of 
inflation. So if inflation was 0 per cent, it would pay 101 Euros. If inflation was 5 
per cent, it would pay 106 Euros. In balance sheet terms, if such an asset traded 
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in the market today for 100 Euros, we can also set the today’s liability value for 
a payment promise one year hence of 101 Euros plus the rate of inflation at 100 
Euros. Once again, there is a perfect asset/liability balance today, with the asset 
able to exactly extinguish the liability one year from now.
What would be the PIC balance sheet impact if the nominal 3 per cent 
market interest rate (in Case 1) or the 1 per cent inflation-indexed market 
interest rate (in Case 2) changed tomorrow? The simple answer is that while the 
’fair value’ of both the assets and the liabilities on the two balance sheets would 
change, the changes in asset and liability values would exactly offset each 
other. Conversely, if the duration and inflation-sensitivity of a PIC balance sheet 
did not match perfectly, that PIC would be carrying asset/liability mismatch 
risk on its balance sheet, against which insurance company regulations require 
a solvency buffer. The greater the mismatch risk, the greater the solvency buffer 
required.
The key lesson here is that the ideal benchmark for measuring PIC balance 
sheet solvency risk is a portfolio of securities that match the accrued payment 
obligations in duration and inflation sensitivity. A PIC balance sheet is ’at risk’ 
to the degree its assets don’t provide such a match, and a large-enough solvency 
buffer will be required to ensure that pensions promised will become pensions 
paid. Establishing this ’large-enough’ buffer will require the employment of 
state-of-the-art simulation and stress-testing techniques.5
How Finnish PICs actually measure and manage solvency risk
My readings and conversations on how PIC balance sheet mismatch risk is 
actually measured, managed, and regulated, suggest that actual practices do 
not align closely with the ideal framework set out above. As the pre-funded 
component of Finnish pension obligations are not explicitly inflation-indexed, 
Case 1 applies, requiring the creation of a benchmark liability-hedging portfolio 
of nominal, Euro-pay, high-quality debt securities that match the duration 
structure of accrued payment promises.6 The appropriate liability discount rate 
at any point in time is the duration-weighted average market yield on such a 
portfolio, or a reasonable proxy thereof.
This is not how the actual PIC liability discount rate is set in Finland. 
Instead, it is set as part of the periodic processes of updating Finnish pension 
5 There are active European Union discussions underway about applying the Solvency II regulatory 
framework for the regulation of insurance companies to the pensions sector under the rubric of the 
’holistic balance sheet’ balance sheet proposal. These discussions are far from resolved. 
6 Or derivatives based on those securities.
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arrangements in response to changing times. The rate was set at 5 per cent in 
the 1970s, and reduced to 3 per cent in 1997 as part of a broader pension reform 
package implemented at that time. A nominal 3 per cent liability discount rate 
was conservative for the PIC-relevant liability-hedging portfolio in 1997. With 
the dramatic fall in high-quality interest rates since then (especially over the 
course of the last five years), a 3 per cent liability discount rate is no longer 
conservative. For example, the yield on Long AAA Euro bonds is 2.5 per cent 
today. That discount rate, and assuming an average liability-duration of 10 
years, would imply that PICs are now understating the risk-free economic value 
of their accrued liabilities by some 5 per cent today. This in turn implies that 
the economic values of the PIC solvency buffers are more like 14 per cent today, 
rather than the reported average +20 per cent.7
These economic realities do not mean that a 100 per cent asset/liability-
matching strategy is always the right investment strategy, even if it could be 
implemented. Solvency buffers can be invested in return-seeking strategies 
involving balance sheet mismatch risk. An important message from the 
traumatic 2007–2011 capital markets experience is that balance sheet mismatch 
risks not likely to be rewarded should be hedged away. The Danish national 
pension scheme ATP adopted this philosophy a decade ago and as a result, had 
matching asset gains offsetting the liability increases resulting from falling bond 
yields over the course of the last five years. As a result, ATP has been able to 
maintain its positive solvency buffer on a ’fair value’ basis during this period 
despite having to discount its liabilities at much lower rates.8 
Like many other pension organizations around the world, Finland’s PICs 
have concentrated their risk management function on the asset side of their 
balance sheets.9 No doubt, asset-only investment risk can be an important 
contributor to overall balance sheet risk. But it cannot tell the whole risk story. 
7  A simplifying rule of thumb is that at a duration of 10 years, a 0.5 drop in yield increases the 
liability by 5 per cent. So, for example, assume reported assets are 120 and the reported liability 
100, leading to a reported funded ratio of 120 per cent. If the economic liability is really 105, then the 
economic funded ratio is 120/105=114%. 
8  For more detail, see The Ambachtsheer Letter ”Effective Pension Management: the Cases of ATP 
and HOOPP”, which is appended to this Report. The Letter notes that ATP’s annualized asset return 
for the 2007–2011 period was 11.8 per cent vs. 3.9 per cent for the median Euro fund in the CEM 
Benchmarking Inc. database. The reported asset returns for Finnish PICs Varma and Ilmarinen over this 
period were 2.2 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively.  
9  This involves understanding the asset portfolio exposure risks and diversification potential of 
broad economic and geographic investment factors, of specific industry factors, and of risks specific to 
individual government and corporate securities issuers in home countries and abroad. The liability side 
can be brought in to some degree by simulating possible real asset return outcomes versus the 3 per 
cent real return requirement. What such simulations miss of course, is that the liability discount rate is 
in fact not constant, but also variable, and subject to considerable future uncertainty.   
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Recognizing that high-quality pension promises are effectively high-quality PIC 
bonds is an equally important contributor to understanding and managing PIC 
balance sheet risk. It leads directly to the recognition that the risks associated 
with servicing pension debt can be ’immunized’ (even if only imperfectly) by 
a portfolio of matching assets or their derivatives. It further clarifies the only 
justification for undertaking balance sheet mismatch risk: to earn additional 
return while maintaining balance sheet solvency at the same time.
Taking PIC balance sheet risk management to the next level
What could be done to take PIC balance sheet risk management to the next 
level? The preceding logic and experience suggests Finland should consider the 
following three steps:
1. Consider changing the PIC liability discount rate from an arbitrary value-
setting process (e.g., from 5% to 3% in 1997) to one that always reflects 
current market realities (e.g., currently about 2.5%).
2. Recognize that not the entire prefunded pension benefit needs to be 
guaranteed. For example, an age-related proportion could be guaranteed 
(and as closely matched with like-assets as possible). The rest of the assets 
could be placed in a unitized, well-managed, long horizon, global return-
seeking fund without guarantees, with plan members owning fund units 
regularly valued at ’fair value’. This split follows logically from the Tinbergen 
Rule requiring that the number of goals must be matched by the number 
of instruments designed to achieve them.10 Denmark’s ATP and America’s 
TIAA-CREF have successfully implemented the principle of separating 
the return-seeking and liability-hedging goals of their stakeholders into 
separate implementation instruments. QSuper in Australia is moving in a 
similar direction.11
3. Decide how the resulting lessons learned are best adapted to, and 
implemented in the Finnish pension system.
These suggestions are made in the context of the current Finnish pension 
financing model, which effectively treats the 75 per cent pay-go-funded pension 
10 The Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen was awarded the first-ever Nobel Prize in Economics in 1969 
for his ’the number of goals must be matched by the number of instruments’ principle.
11 For more detail, see the Ambachtsheer Letters ”The Dysfunctional ’DB vs. DC’ Debate: Why and 
How to Move Beyond It” and ”Turning DC Frogs into Pension Prince Charmings: Building Pension Plans 
that Serve Real People”, which are appended to this report.
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component and the 25 per cent pre-funded pension component as separate, 
independent pieces of the total pension pot. In other words, the question raised 
here was whether 100 per cent of the liabilities accruing in the pre-funded part 
of the system needed to be guaranteed, or whether that requirement could be 
relaxed so that a greater proportion of accumulated pension assets could be 
allocated to long-horizon return-seeking investment strategies. 
Are PIC solvency requirements needed at all?
Some Finnish pension and investment experts made the argument during my 
Helsinki conversations that the forced segmentation of pay-go/pre-funded 
pension liabilities in the Finnish system causes unnecessary investment 
inefficiencies and unnecessarily constrains to investing for the long term. The 
essence of the argument is that the earnings-based component of the Finnish 
pension system is effectively a mandatory collective pay-go system with about 
600B Euros in accrued payment obligations, and a financial assets buffer of 
approximately 150B Euros.
The logic that follows from this framing is that the entire 150B Euro asset 
pool should be released from any solvency-related constraints, and should be 
assigned a long-horizon return-seeking mandate. In this framing, it would 
be clear to all that pension system sustainability is ultimately determined at 
the national level in an integrated manner. It would take into account pay-go 
premiums, pre-funded premiums, and investment income from the buffer fund 
vs. projected pension payments all at the same time. This is how the Canada 
Pension Plan operates.12 If Finland’s current 150B Euro buffer fund generated 
an additional average annual 1 per cent per year by moving to a long-horizon 
return-seeking mandate, its pension system (and hence Finnish citizens) would 
be an expected 1.5B Euros per year richer over the long run.13
Traditional thinking and theory would assign a higher degree of risk 
exposure to such a strategy. A credible counter-argument is that over long 
12 See ”Measuring the Sustainability of National Social Insurance Plans: The Case of the Canada 
Pension Plan” by Jean-Claude Menard (The Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 
RIJPM, Fall 2010) for details on how Canada does this. An outcome is that the CPP Investment Board 
manages the CPP buffer fund (currently about $170B) with a global, return-seeking mandate and a 
modest short-term liquidity reserve.  
13 For example, assuming a long term 3 per cent risk premium of equity-like investments over 
debt-like investments, shifting the current (roughly) 45–55 Finnish mix to an 80–20 mix would 
increase the expected return on the asset pool by 1 per cent/yr. Detailed 21st Century capital markets 
prognostications fall outside the scope of this Report. In my view, projections of a 4 per cent net real 
return for equity-like investments and 1 per cent for debt-like investments are not unrealistic. 
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investment horizons in the 21st Century, a diversified portfolio of cash-flows 
(e.g., dividend payments or their equivalents) being generated by well-managed 
global corporations with dividend-paying cultures may in fact be less risky than 
the coupon payment-related cash-flows of a portfolio of bonds issued by the 
governments of countries with deteriorating demographics and fiscal positions. 
If the cash-flows attached to the former are less risky than those attached to the 
latter, so are their long horizon principal values.
Where do ’competition’ and ’co-operation’ between the PICs fit into 
this story?
’Competition’ and ’co-operation’ make for strange bedfellows. Maybe less so in a 
’mutual’ setting without shareholders interested a rising stock price, and without 
a need to raise capital in the financial markets, as is the case with Finnish 
pension institutions. Nevertheless, a rationale for the current Finnish pension 
industry structure, and a logic framework to assess its potential effectiveness, 
are needed.
Let’s start with some actual industry experience. Data provided by TELA 
shows a steady decline in the number and type of Finnish pension organizations 
over time (e.g., from 164 in 1970 to 37 in 2012), with most of that decline due 
to a fall in corporate pension funds from 137 to 15. At the same time, client 
turnover within the PIC sector has been averaging about 5 per cent per annum 
recently. This experience suggests massive pension industry consolidation over 
the course of the last 40 years, and a modest rate of client turnover between 
PICs in the last decade. 
Now let us employ some deductive thinking to see where the Finnish 
pension industry could/should go from here. The standard economic rationale 
for fostering competition in an industry is that it raises product/service quality 
and keeps the lid on prices. Pension industry organizations offer two very 
different services: 1. Investment Management, and 2. Benefit Administration. 
Thus in theory, the ideal pension organization is a ’competitive’ supplier in both 
fields, and can demonstrate it with persuasive evidence readily understood by 
current and prospective customers.
Unfortunately, such demonstrations are difficult to achieve in both service 
areas. A further confounding factor is that there is not a single coherent 
customer base. Finnish employers are the primary beneficiaries of extended 
superior investment performance and operational efficiencies, while employees 
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are the primary beneficiaries of service quality in benefit provision. These 
realities suggest that an emphasis on co-operation/collaboration strategies 
rather than on competitive strategies may produce better outcomes for all, 
including for employers of all sizes. Specifically:
1. Investment management: logic suggests and research confirms that most 
buyers of investment management services are unsophisticated, and chase 
recent good performance. Unfortunately, logic also suggests and research 
also confirms that recent good performance is far more likely to be noise 
than signal. So once an investment management organization has sufficient 
market share, the rational thing to do is to defend it by ’herding’. In other 
words, to navigate investment policy into the middle of the pack, thus 
ensuring no significant underperformance and loss of market share. The 
Swedish AP Funds offer an interesting example of this behavior. As part of 
Swedish pension reform a decade ago, four equal-sized buffer funds were 
created to foster competition and diversify investment risk. Predictably, the 
strategy achieved neither goal, as the AP Fund managers rationally herded 
together with very similar investment policies and hence very similar 
investment results. There is now an active debate in Sweden on how to 
amalgamate the four smallish 25B Euro Funds so that a single, much larger-
scaled buffer fund can become a competitive world-class investor.14
2. Benefit Administration: as in investments, there are strong scale economies 
in pension administration services (e.g., record keeping, pension payments, 
member communications, etc).15 With a strong governance/management 
function in place, scale drives down unit costs here as well. At the same 
time, a strong governance/management function ensures PIC customers 
receive a suite of high-quality pensions and insurance services.
In short, there is no compelling logic that suggests competition between the 
PIC will increase investment returns or create more cost-effective pension and 
insurance administration services in Finland. In contrast, it appears much 
could be gained through well-thought-out co-operative strategies on both the 
investment and benefit administration sides of the fence. So for example, two 
or more of the Finnish pension organizations could merge their investment 
functions into a single, much larger-scaled global investment organization. 
14 See the article ”Pension capital reform ’does not go far enough’”, Financial Times, September 17, 
2012.
15 See the working paper ”The Impact of Scale, Complexity, and Service Quality on the Administrative 
Costs of Pension Funds: A Cross-Country Comparison” by Bikker et al., De Nederlandsche Bank, 2010.
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Similarly, on the administration side, the consolidation of some of the Finnish 
pension and insurance administration functions could result in significant cost 
savings. 
Counter arguments
It is important at this point to acknowledge some of the counter arguments to 
these scale-based consolidation arguments. These counter arguments include:
•	 The PIC structure creates a standardized framework within which to assess 
organizational behavior and performance.
•	 The PIC structure ensures the Finnish pension system maintains a strong 
asset buffer through time.
•	 The PIC structure fosters cost and risk sharing, and creates a competitive 
environment at the same time.
•	 The PIC structure creates a powerful bulwark against government overreach 
(e.g., asset confiscation), as has in fact occurred in other countries.
These arguments should be taken seriously. However, it does seem worth-while 
to try to estimate what the return gain/cost reduction potential of a material 
consolidation of Finland’s pension industry might add up to. It will put a price 
on some of the perceived advantages of the current structure. 
Accordingly, the Report now moves from the deductive to the inductive. 
Specifically, how do the aggregate Finnish investment and benefit administrative 
functions stack up against a global peer group as value propositions? Section III 
of this Report addresses that question.
Section II summary and conclusions 
1. On the whole, the institutional structure of Finland’s pension system, while 
complex, is one of the most robust in the world.
2. The pay-go/prefunded financing ratio is a key policy lever in the Finnish 
pension system. Developing dynamic/automatic decision rules for why and 
how that ratio should be adjusted over time would represent an important 
pension policy innovation for Finland.
3. In a solvency context, PICs may now be understating the economic value of 
their accrued liabilities by some 5 per cent. This in turn implies PIC solvency 
buffers are now likely below the reported average +20 per cent.
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4. Not the entire accrued prefunded pension benefit needs to be guaranteed. 
For example, only an age-related proportion could be guaranteed (and as 
closely matched with like-assets as possible). The rest could be placed in a 
unitized, well-managed, long horizon, global return-seeking fund without 
guarantees, with plan members owning fund units at ’fair value’.
5. There is an argument that solvency buffers are redundant in the Finnish 
pension system. Why? Because the employment-based component of the 
Finnish pension system is a mandatory collective pay-go system with 600B 
Euros (approximately) in accrued payment obligations and a financial 
assets buffer of 150B Euros (approximately). It follows from this perspective 
that the entire 150B Euro asset pool could be released from any solvency 
considerations, and should only have a return-seeking mandate. Such a 
switch in framing the purpose of Finland’s 150B in pension assets could 
increase their long term annual return by as much as 1 per cent/yr, or $1.5B/
yr in current Euro terms.
6. There is no compelling deductive logic that suggests competition between 
the PIC will increase investment returns or create more cost-effective 
pension administration services in Finland. In contrast, much could be 
gained through well-thought-out co-operative strategies on both the 
investment and benefit administration sides of the fence. 
7. However, there are credible arguments in favor of keeping the institutional 
structure as it is (e.g., standardized assessment framework, bulwark against 
government overreach). An objective cost-benefit analysis would help clarify 
the costs and benefits of material consolidation of the asset management 
and benefit administration functions. 
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SECTION III
Do Finland’s pension institutions produce ’value for 
money’ for their stakeholders?
Benchmarking ’value for money’ in pension institutions
Pension institutions perform two essential functions:
1. Invest the financial assets under their care.
2. Communicate with stakeholders, and calculate and pay benefits.
Effective pension institutions perform these two functions very well. The 
Boards of pension institutions have a responsibility to assess organizational 
effectiveness, and hence a responsibility to assess how well the organization 
is performing its two essential functions. This in turn requires establishing 
’value for money’ standards. In other words, a Board must know how much its 
organization is spending to execute its investment and benefit administration 
functions, and what results stakeholders are realizing for the money spent. 
Then, ideally, the Board is able to compare its organization’s results against 
those of a relevant peer group in order to make an informed ’value for money’ 
assessment.
With the assistance of Finland’s Centre for Pensions and 8 major 
Finnish pension institutions, CEM Benchmarking Inc. performed ’value for 
money’ benchmarking studies of both the aggregate investment and benefit 
administration functions. In other words, the data of the individual Finnish 
institutions was combined to produce a single pan-Finland investment function 
and a single pan-Finland benefit administration function. The measured ’value 
for money’ of each of these pan-Finland functions was then evaluated versus 
comparable global ’value for money’ standards. The findings of these studies 
are reported next, first for the investment function and then for the benefit 
administration function. 
Benchmarking investment costs
In order to create a composite ’Finland Pension Fund’ (FPF), CEM combined 
the investment function data of 8 actual Finnish pension organizations: Etera, 
Fennia, Ilmarinen, KEVA, Tapiola, VER, Veritas, and Varma. A single 125B 
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Euro FPF resulted, which was benchmarked against 2 global peer groups in 
the CEM database: a 15-member Larger Funds group (average asset value 80B 
Euros) and a 20-member Smaller Funds group (average asset value 20B Euros). 
The rationale for the creating two separate peer groups was to benchmark FPF 
against a peer group with fund sizes comparable to that of the aggregate total 
FPF, and also against a peer group with fund sizes comparable to the average 
size of the 8 individual Finnish pension organizations that comprise FPF.
All 2011 costs reported below are comparable when reported in basis 
points (i.e., bps, in units of 1/100th of 1%) relative to average 2011 fund values. 
Total costs comprise 2 broad cost categories: direct investment management 
costs and indirect costs (e.g., fund oversight, custodial fees, consulting fees, 
legal fees, etc.). Direct investment management costs are further disaggregated 
into internally-managed vs. externally-managed mandates, active vs. passive 
mandates, and by asset classes.
CEM calculations indicate total FPF asset management cost in 2011 
amounted to 615M Euros. Table 1 splits the total into four components: direct 
internal and external investment management costs and other internal and 
external asset management-related costs. The latter group of costs includes such 
categories as asset custody, consulting, audit, and internal oversight and general 
management. Note that the bulk of the 615M Euros in asset management costs 
were external investment management fees (i.e., 537M Euros). In turn, the bulk 
of those external fees (about 400M Euros) were spent on private markets (e.g., 
private equity, real estate) investing and hedge fund fees.
Table 1. FPF total asset management costs in 2011 (millions of Euros).
Investment 
management
Other Total
Internal 46M 21M 67M
External 537M 11M 548M
Total 583M 32M 615M
Source: CEM Benchmarking Inc.
Figure 1 converts the 615M Euros of total asset management costs into 49.2bps 
in relation to FPF average 2011 asset value of 125B Euros. This cost experience 
compares to an average 47.4bps for the Larger Fund peer group, and 41.3bps for 
’Smaller’. So FPF total cost experience is quite similar to average global Larger 
Fund experience, but higher than that of Smaller Fund experience. How should 
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we interpret these findings? Why was FPF investment cost experience so similar 
to that of ’Larger’? And higher than ’Smaller’ experience? According to the 
CEM study:
•	 The main reason for FPF and global ’Larger’ having higher average 
investment costs than global ’Smaller’ is asset mix-related. Specifically, FPF 
and ’Larger’ had 5 percentage points higher exposure to high-cost (e.g., 
200+bps) asset classes such as Private Equity and Hedge Funds than did 
’Smaller’.
•	 What the average investment cost numbers do not show are two largely 
offsetting differences in direct investment management cost experience 
between FPF and both ’Larger’ and ’Smaller’. First, FPF manages a 
significantly higher proportion of its assets internally (on average 65%) 
rather than non-Finnish funds do (on average 12%). This leads to material 
cost savings (-5.2bps or 64M Euros vs. ’Larger’ and -6.2bps or 78M Euros vs. 
’Smaller’). However, these cost savings are offset by paying relatively higher 
management fees to outside investment managers (+4.9bps or 62M Euros 
vs. ’Larger’ and +2.3bps or 30M Euros vs. ’Smaller’).
•	 FPF’s other asset management costs in 2011 amounted to 32M Euros, or 
2.4bps of assets. This cost performance lies in between 2.1bps for ’Larger’ 
and 3.2bps for ’Smaller’. The latter is the more relevant benchmark, as 
the funds in the ’Larger’ group benefit from material economies of scale. 
In contrast, ’Smaller’ funds are more comparable to the average value of 
the 8 Finnish funds comprising FPF. A major reason for the superior FPF 
cost performance here was paying 0.8bps (9M Euros) less in custodial and 
consulting fees than the average global ’Smaller’ fund.  
So on the whole, FPF investment cost performance is in line with that of 
comparable non-Finnish pension funds. While on the one hand greater use 
of high-cost asset classes and paying relatively-higher external investment 
management fees for similar mandates pushed costs up, the greater use of lower-
cost internally-managed investment mandates and paying less for services 
such as asset custody and consulting pushed them back down again. The ’in 
line’ investment cost performance observation is confirmed by the fact that 
FPF’s total investment costs of 49.2bps is only marginally above CEM’s Global 
Universe median experience of 47.5bps. (See Figure 1).
32  EVALUATION OF THE FINNISH PENSION SYSTEM / PART 2
Figure 1. FPF investment costs vs. global larger and smaller fund peer group 
investment costs.
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Benchmarking the internal oversight function
The internal oversight function is of special interest because that is where a 
pension organization’s strategic decisions are made and where most control 
and monitoring activities are carried out. Importantly, ranking ’low cost’ in 
this function may not be a good thing if it materially impacts the quality of 
the organization’s strategic decision-making and control processes. The CEM 
benchmarking process led to a FPF cost estimate for this function of 1.6bps 
(20M Euros for the 8 Finnish funds together, or an average 2.5M Euros per 
fund). This compares an average 1.5bps for global ’Larger’ (which converts to 
12.0M Euros for a single 80B Euro fund), and 1.7bps for global ’Smaller’ (which 
converts to 3.4M Euros for a single 20B Euro fund). These comparisons suggest 
that, on average, Finnish funds spend almost 1M Euros/year less on internal 
oversight than an international peer group of funds of a similar size. Both 
’Smaller’ groups spend considerably less on Internal Oversight than the ’Larger’ 
group, which spends an average 12M Euros/year on this function. Arguably, the 
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incremental 9M Euros gives ’Larger’ funds a material comparative advantage in 
building their internal strategic decision-making and control processes. 
Benchmarking investment function compensation
In order to dig even more deeply into the annual cost of the Internal Oversight 
function, we collected total compensation data (salary, benefits, and incentive-
related, most recent fiscal year) for the entire investment function of the major 
Finnish Funds. Figure 2 compares Finnish fund total compensation experience 
for the investment function against that of fund samples drawn from Australia/
New Zealand, Canada, Europe, and the USA. In the top chart, the five 
individuals with the highest total compensation experience are excluded. The 
bottom chart displays the same information for the ’Top 5’ in each participating 
fund. The charts indicate that total compensation experience of the Finnish 
investment function falls significantly below that of the experience in all of 
the other four regions. For example, the average ’Top 5’ total compensation 
experience for pension funds in Australia/New Zealand, USA, Europe, Canada, 
and Finland was (in Euros) 481K, 339K, 342K, 847K, and 244K respectively. 
These comparative total compensation findings are consistent with the Internal 
Oversight expense findings drawn from the CEM benchmarking study cited 
above. They confirm that by international standards, Finnish Funds spend less 
on their internal investment function than their peers in other parts of the 
world.
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Figure 2. Benchmarking investment function compensation.
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Benchmarking investment performance
The CEM investment benchmarking study reported a 5-year annualized net 
return of 2.5 per cent for the Finland Pension Fund (FPF) for the 2007–2011 
period. The median net return for the Global Larger Funds peer group was 3.5 
per cent over the same period. CEM also calculates a ’policy return’ for each 
fund in its investment benchmarking database, which is the estimated return 
the fund would have achieved if it had implemented its chosen investment 
policy passively. FPF’s 5-year policy return was 2.1 per cent versus a median 
3.6 per cent for the Global peer group. The implication is that FPF actually 
outperformed its policy benchmark over the period (i.e., 2.5% vs. 2.1%) while 
the median Global Fund did not (i.e., 3.5% vs. 3.6%). These findings raise the 
interesting question why FPF’s policy return was an average 1.5 per cent per 
year lower than that of the median Global Fund over the 2007–2011 period. 
How did its broad investment policy differ from that of the global peer group? 
Figure 3 helps identify the problem, which were the relatively poor FPF 
policy returns in 2010 and 2011. What happened in those two years? It was 
a combination of two things: 1. The Finnish stock market performed poorly 
relative to other stock markets, and 2. FPF had a 14 per cent weighting to 
public Finnish stocks at the end of 2008, and an additional 3 per cent to private 
Finnish equity versus very small Finnish weightings at best for the global peer 
group.16 In short, FPF’s strong home-country bias in its investment policy over 
the course of 2007–2011 led to a material drag on its investment performance 
during this period.  
16 The 5-year return on the MSCI Global stock index was -1.1 per cent over the 2007–2011 period 
versus -9.8 per cent for the Finnish stock index. The share price of Nokia dropped approximately 90 per 
cent over this period. 
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Figure 3. Global policy returns – quartile rankings.
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Benchmarking pension administration costs
CEM has been benchmarking the pension administration functions in pension 
organizations around the world since 1998. Recognizing the differing rules and 
conventions between countries, a standardized benchmarking protocol evolved 
that has served some 100 organizations in 7 different countries. A customized 
CEM benchmarking report was created for this study, using data from the same 
8 Finnish organizations comprising the FPF as defined above. 
Figure 4 displays the 2011 pension administration costs for FPF versus 
those of 11 large pension organizations from other countries. The total number 
of workers and pensioners serviced through FPF was 3.7M versus an average 
1.5M per organization for the entire sample. At the employer level, FPF 
serviced 347K clients versus an average 45K for the peer group. Total pension 
administration costs for FPF in 2011 amounted to 440M Euros, or 107 Euros/
participant. Note that this was the highest per-member cost in the peer group, 
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where the average was 60 Euros/participant. In explaining the difference, CEM 
noted the following 3 factors:
•	 FPF is not a single organization, but a composite of 8 much smaller 
organizations. The resulting negative scale impact is estimated at +30 Euros/
annuitant. In other words, the scale-adjusted peer average against which to 
compare FPF is not 60 Euros/participant, but 90 Euros/participant.
•	 The Finnish employment-based pension system is more complex than the 
Pillar 2 (i.e., employment-based pension plan) component in other countries 
(e.g., pension insurance companies are Finland’s primary long term disability 
administrators). This leads to higher transaction volumes (i.e., workloads) 
for Finnish pension organizations. These higher transaction volumes add an 
additional 11 Euros/participant to the FPF-relevant benchmark, taking it up 
to 101 Euros.
•	 The Finnish employment-based pension system is also unique in the sense 
that on the private sector PIC side, there is a competitive element which 
generates marketing and sales costs, as well as an additional client service 
level which focuses on the PIC’s employer-clients. Further, the cross-
insurance feature of the PICs requires an additional layer of participant 
calculations which are performed by the Finnish Center for Pensions, which 
is financially supported by the PICs. It is a reasonable assumption that these 
additional costs unique to the Finnish employment-based pension account 
for most of the remaining difference between the 107 Euros/participant cost 
experience of FPF and the average 60 Euros experience of the global peer 
group. 
In short, the relatively high Finnish benefit administration costs are due to the 
joint effects of smaller scale (63% or 30 Euros), greater complexity (23% or 11 
Euros), and a number of special costs due to the unique structure of the Finnish 
Pension Insurance companies (14% or 6 Euros). 
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Figure 4. Total pension administration costs per active member and annuitant.
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There is another element to be considered in comparing benefit administration 
costs across countries, and that is the presence or absence of statutory Pillar 1 
pension arrangements. In the case of Finland, its employment-based pension 
system effectively combines Pillar 1 and 2 together. In contrast, many other 
countries have separate Pillar 1 social security arrangements (e.g., Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Netherlands, UK, USA). Ideally, the Finnish benefit 
administration cost experience should be compared to the combined Pillar 
1 and 2 benefit administration costs of other countries.17 This ideal does not 
negate the validity of the benchmark findings set out above. However, it does 
mean that Finland benefits from an efficiency that many other countries do not 
have: the effective integration of Pillar 1 and 2 benefit administration services. 
 
Benchmarking member service levels
Member service levels are also benchmarked by CEM by creating metrics in 
such areas as member contacts, member statements, pension inceptions, 
websites, and member counseling. Based on these metrics, a composite service 
score is created for each participating pension organization. Figure 5 shows 
17 Information at the national level is becoming available on the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 benefit 
administration costs in some countries. A forthcoming study by the Finnish Centre for Pensions 
titled ”Administrative Expenses in Statutory and Occupational Pension Schemes: A Cross-country 
Comparison” (2013) indicates combined Pillar 1 and 2 costs per person in other countries (e.g., 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway) are considerably higher than the combined Finnish per person 
costs. 
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FPF with a composite score of 70 versus a peer average score of 75, indicating 
member service levels below global standards for large pension organizations. 
Contributing factors included marginally lower scores for member call time 
windows, member own-data access, speed of pension annuity inceptions, 
and one-on-one counseling incidence. On the positive side, the unique cross-
insurance feature of the PIC system was not scored in the CEM system. 
In its report commentary, CEM notes Finnish pension organizations 
spend considerably more time and energy interacting with employers than 
do their international counterparts. Specifically, they reported 55 per cent of 
their administration costs being employer-related versus 10 per cent for the 
global sample. These interactions are not explicitly benchmarked by CEM. 
Interestingly, one of the cited reasons for this greater employer focus in 
Finland is pension insurance company competition to retain current clients 
and attract new ones. There is no obvious connection between these employer 
client retention activities and providing quality pension and related services to 
enrolled employees. 
Figure 5. Total service scores, score out of 100.
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Section III summary and conclusions
1. CEM calculations indicate the total FPF asset management cost in 2011 
amounted to 615M Euros. The largest cost category was external investment 
management fees at 537M Euros, within which about 400M Euros related 
to private markets and hedge fund investment fees. FPF is the aggregate 
portfolio of eight Finnish pension funds. 
40  EVALUATION OF THE FINNISH PENSION SYSTEM / PART 2
2. The 615M Euros convert into 49.2bps in relation to FPF average 2011 asset 
value of 125B Euros. This cost experience compares to an average 47.4bps 
for the Larger Fund global peer group, and 41.3bps for ’Smaller’. 
3. FPF and ’Larger’ both had higher cost experience because both used higher 
proportions of ’high-cost’ investment strategies than ’Smaller’. FPF in-
sourced a far greater proportion of its asset management function than 
either ’Larger’ or ’Smaller’. However, this cost advantage was offset by FPF 
by paying higher fees for external management.
4. FPF spends less on its Internal Oversight function than either ’Larger’ or 
’Smaller’, according to the CEM study. A separate KPA study of ’TOP 5’ total 
compensation found Finnish funds paid their ’TOP 5’ materially less than 
their counterparts in North America, Europe, and Australia/New Zealand.  
5. FPF earned a net return of 2.5 per cent over the 2007–2011 period, versus 
3.5 per cent for the median global fund. FPF actually outperformed 
its benchmark policy return (2.1%), while the median global fund 
underperformed its policy return (3.6%). The 1.5 per cent difference in 
policy returns was due to FPF’s 17 per cent weighting in Finnish equities 
at the end of 2007, which materially underperformed global equity indexes 
over the 2007–2011 period.
6. FPF’s 2011 pension administration costs and member service levels were 
benchmarked versus those of 11 large pension organizations from other 
countries. The total number of workers and pensioners serviced through 
FPF was 3.7M versus an average 1.5M per organization for the entire 
sample. Total pension administration costs for FPF in 2011 amounted to 
440M Euros, or 107 Euros/participant. This was the highest per-member 
cost in the peer group, where the average was 60 Euros/participant. 
7. FPF’s materially-higher cost experience is driven by three factors: 1) FPF is 
not a single organization, but a composite of 8 much smaller organizations, 
resulting in a negative scale impact of approximately 30 Euros/annuitant, 2) 
The Finnish employment-based pension system is more complex than the 
Pillar 2 in other countries, resulting in a complexity impact of approximately 
11 Euros/participant, and 3) The remaining 6 Euros/participant relates to 
there being a competitive element in play, generating marketing and sales 
costs. Also, the cross-insurance feature of the PICs requires an additional 
layer of participant accrued benefit calculations.
8. In aggregate, FPF’s materially higher benefit administration costs are due 
to the joint effects of smaller scale (63%), greater complexity (23%), and a 
number of special costs due to the unique structure of the Finnish Pension 
Insurance companies (14%). 
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9. An offset to these higher benefit administration cost is the fact that Finland’s 
employment-based pension sector effectively combines the social security 
and supplementary pensions sectors of its pension system. These two 
sectors are administered separately in many other countries, thus incurring 
separate benefit administration costs in each sector.
10. FPF’s member service score at 70 was lower than the average 75 score in the 
global peer group. CEM noted that the Finnish PICs devote considerably 
more energies to servicing employer-clients than the global peer group, 
likely due to the competitive element in the Finnish pension services market. 
However, the unique PIC cross-insurance feature is not scored by CEM.  
11. An implication of these Section III findings is that significant potential scale 
economies exist in Finland’s pension structure in both the investment and 
benefit administration functions. For example, further internalization of 
investment management (especially in private markets) would materially 
reduce the current 500M+ Euros being spent annually on external 
management fees. However, achieving these cost savings will require larger 
Finnish pension investment organizations that can attract and retain private 
markets investment specialists. Similarly, the CEM analysis of the benefit 
administration function suggests significant unit cost savings are possible 
through consolidation of the multiple benefit administration functions 
currently operating in Finland.  
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SECTION IV
How ’ideal’ is the governance and organization design of 
Finnish pension institutions?
The Drucker model
Thirty-seven years ago, Peter Drucker, considered by many to be the father of 
modern management theory and practice, wrote a short book expressing his 
concerns about the stewardship of assets that would cover future pension and 
other long-horizon liabilities.18 Most importantly, he wondered in whose interest 
the coming flood of assets related to these liabilities would be managed. He 
worried that the power embedded in these large asset pools would be hi-jacked 
by possible power groups such as business, organized labour, government, or 
the financial services industry.
He argued strongly that to prevent this from happening, long-horizon assets 
would have to be ring-fenced into large-scale trust arrangements dedicated 
to serving the interests of beneficiaries. He further argued that these trust 
arrangements should be overseen by Boards of Directors who were not only 
committed to serving the interests of beneficiaries, but also had the collective 
skills and experience to oversee the management of a complex financial 
institution with (a) value-creating long- and short-horizon asset management 
functions, and (b) a value-creating benefit administration function.
A few years ago, a few months before he died at age 96, I had a chance to ask 
him how he thought ”pension revolution” was turning out. He responded that 
it could have been better, but it could have been worse too. On the one hand, 
he said, there has indeed been some hi-jacking going by the power groups he 
identified back in 1976. On the other hand, we have also seen the emergence 
of pension management organizations with mandates to operate free of ’power 
group’ influence, and with Boards of Directors willing and able to carry out 
their fiduciary duties with both care and skill.19
18 Peter Drucker, ”The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America”, Harper & 
Row, 1976.
19 See the article ”Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance” by Hawley, Johnson, and Waitzer in RIJPM, Fall 
2011, for a clear exposition of the fiduciary duties of pension fund fiduciaries in the 21st Century.
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Confirming research findings 
A growing body of research findings is confirming Drucker’s 1976 
premonitions. Organizational autonomy and alignment of interests do matter.20 
Good governance does matter.21 These two key ’success’ building blocks are the 
foundation for three others. They lead to a series of sensible investment beliefs 
to guide investment decisions, and an organization design capable of effectively 
implementing those decisions. Scale plays an important role in organization 
design, as it permits the acquisition of the resources required to do the job well, 
while at the same time keeping unit costs low. Finally, attracting and retaining 
the right people inside the organization requires being able to pay competitively 
for the requisite skills and experience.
In the earlier report section on risk management I referenced the Denmark-
based ATP and Canada-based HOOPP pension organizations. I consider them 
’live’ exemplars of this Drucker-inspired governance and organization design 
philosophy (see p. 9). Here I add Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan (OTPP) as 
a third exemplar as, to my knowledge, it has by far the longest track record 
operating under the Drucker management philosophy (since 1990). Over the 
course of its 22-year existence, OTPP has achieved outstanding track records 
in both its investment and pension administration functions. In its investment 
function, for example, OTPP has generated an unprecedented net excess return 
of 2.14 per cent per annum over its passive benchmark portfolio during this 
period. At the same time, in its pension administration function, OTPP has 
generated top ’value for money’ scores ever since CEM has been producing 
these rankings.22
Recent research findings by Dyck and Pomorski further generalize 
the OTPP story. Using the CEM Benchmarking Inc. database, they found 
significant economies of scale accruing to large funds, driven by internalizing 
private markets (e.g., private equity, real estate, infrastructure) investing.23 This 
20 For example, the performance difference between commercial retail mutual funds and wholesale 
co-op pension funds with similar investment mandates is well-documented. For example, a 2007 
ICPM-funded research study ”The Performance of US Pension Funds” by Bauer et al. concluded ”...
pension funds performed close to their benchmarks whereas size-matched retail mutual funds strongly 
underperformed theirs...”.
21 For example, in the article ”The Pension Fund Governance Deficit: Still With Us”, RIJPM, Fall 2008, 
Ambachtsheer et al. concluded: ”...as was the case in 1997, we found a positive correlation between 
governance quality and organizational performance...”. 
22 For more detail, see the article ”Effective Pension Governance: the Ontario Teachers’ Story”, RIJPM, 
Fall 2008, by OTPP’s now-retired CEO Claude Lamoureux. 
23 ”Is Bigger Better? Size and Performance in Pension Fund Management”, Dyck and Pomorski, 
Rotman-ICPM Working Paper, 2011.
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strategy has reduced the cost of operating in these markets materially while 
generating competitive gross returns. It is well-known that the move in this 
direction has been led by OTPP in the 1990s, and since followed other Canadian 
pension funds such as AIMCO, bcIMC, CPPIB, La Caisse, OMERS, and PSP 
Investments.
Pension governance and organization design in Finland
The bulk of Finland’s pension investment and administration activities related 
to private sector are conducted through its 7 licensed not-for-profit pension 
insurance companies (PICs). Relevant documents suggest that key PIC 
governance and organization design features include:
•	 PICs can only provide statutory pension insurance and manage accumulated 
assets. No other lines of business or cross-ownerships are allowed.
•	 An established process creates an Election Committee representing the 
PIC’s stakeholders.
•	 The Election Committees elects a Supervisory Board (SB) at each PIC 
Annual General Meeting, with SB compensation set by the Election 
Committee.
•	 The SB selects the PIC’s Board of Directors (BofD) and confirms 
its remuneration. BofD selection criteria include stakeholder group 
representation (e.g., employers, employees), as well as professional skills/
experience in such areas as strategic management, pension design, 
investments. The BofD should have functioning governance, audit, and 
human resources (HR) committees. A 2/3rds BofD majority is required on 
major decisions.
•	 PIC management is delegated to a Chief Executive, with a Responsible 
Actuary required to approve and monitor the PIC’s investment plan, as well 
as the calculation of PIC liabilities, its solvency margin and solvency limit. 
•	 Excess solvency margins may be bonused back to employers or used as an 
additional buffer for seeking additional returns.
•	 PICs compete for employer business through their ’performance’ in 
generating excess solvency margins, and in providing client services. 
However, they jointly guarantee each others’ liabilities. 
•	 The Finnish FAS and Competition Office monitor PIC financial stability 
and competitive practices.
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This conceptual design looks good, and no doubt guides actual Finnish 
governance practices in positive ways. However, subsequent discussions with 
knowledgeable individuals provided the following additional information and 
insights24: 
•	 Finnish pension organizations are struggling with the same challenge many 
non-Finnish pension organizations continue to struggle with: to assemble 
Boards that are seen to be both representative and effective. Too often, 
effectiveness is sacrificed in the determined quest to ensure all stakeholder 
groups have ’their people’ on the Board. A frequent result is an imbalance of 
power in favor of senior management relative to the Board.
•	 Board education programs are at a too basic level.
•	 The drive for representativeness also shows up in the size of many PIC 
boards: 12 members (often plus 4 alternates) plus is above the ’ideal’ 
9-member size benchmark set by many governance experts.
•	 The current PIC ’rules of the game’ make it difficult for PIC Boards to 
establish the organization’s priorities. Is it to control the PIC’s solvency ratio 
in the short term? How does the Board trade off the short-term solvency 
ratio goal against the long-term return-seeking goal for the PIC’s investment 
portfolio? How does the Board trade off service quality and unit cost in the 
benefit administration function?
•	 Is there enough of an ’arms-length’ relationship between PIC Board members 
and senior managers and the Board members and senior managers of the 
PIC’s corporate clients? There is a feeling in some quarters that some of 
these relationships are not ’arms-length’ enough.
These observations should not necessarily be taken as specific criticisms of 
the governance practices of Finnish pension organizations. Based on personal 
experience, I suggest they could just as easily have described the governance 
challenges facing the Boards of pension organizations anywhere in the world.  
A possible response
Last year, the International Centre for Pension Management and the University 
of Toronto’s School of Management began to jointly offer a 1-week Board 
Effectiveness Program for board members of pension organizations. One of the 
small-group assignments in the Program is to advise the Chair of a hypothetical 
24 In my September conversations in Helsinki and in email correspondence.
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pension organization board that is suffering from too much ’representiveness’ 
and too little governance experience and expertise. After considerable 
discussion, the group offered the following advice to the hypothetical Board 
Chair: 
•	 Involve the Board Governance Committee in finding a solution. (If there is 
no Board Governance Committee, create one).
•	 Think beyond ’either/or’. That is, don’t frame the problem as more governance 
experience and specified expertise at the expense of less ’representiveness’. 
Instead, frame the challenge as ’how do we get both?’ 
•	 Get ’buy-in’ from the various stakeholder groups (e.g., representing 
employers and representing employees) on the importance of answering the 
’how do we get both?’ question.
•	 Develop a requisite skills/experience matrix for the board of a pension 
organization. For example, the ideal pension organization board has skills/
experience in the key areas of organization strategy, investments, actuarial 
science, audit/risk management, HR management.
•	 Get agreement from the various stakeholder groups that they will work 
together to create a board appointment process that produces a board 
that collectively passes the requisite skills/experience test as set out in the 
agreed-upon matrix.
•	 Devise a practical plan to implement the agreement.
Generalizing from this specific example, Board Chairs of pension organizations 
(together with the Board Governance Committee) have an explicit responsibility 
to do whatever it takes to build and maintain a high level of board effectiveness. 
They must be held accountable for achieving this outcome.25
Section IV summary and conclusions
1. The writings of management philosopher Peter Drucker offer a sound 
foundation for thinking about effective governance and organization design 
of pension organizations. There is mounting empirical evidence that when 
put in proper practice, this foundation translates into the creation of value 
in both the investment and benefit administration functions of pension 
organizations.
25 See ”Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance” by Hawley, Johnson, and Waitzer in RIJPM, Fall 2011 for a 
21st Century legal perspective on the fiduciary duties of board members of pension organizations. 
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2. Finland has developed a detailed protocol for the creation and management 
of its pension institutions, covering the selection of boards of directors 
and CEOs, the creation of board committees, the creation and approval of 
investment plans, as well as the calculation of liabilities, solvency margins, 
solvency limits, and the rules inter-PIC competition and risk-sharing.
3. However, as in other countries, there appears to be a Finnish gap between 
aspirations and realities. The desire for ’representiveness’ on boards is 
often stronger than the desire for collective board skill/experience and 
effectiveness. Education programs are too basic. The PIC solvency rules 
often conflict with long-horizon wealth-creation, which in turn can conflict 
with the perceived need to be ’competitive’.
4. The current aspiration-reality governance gap can be addressed through a 
set of explicit strategies that focus on creating pension organization boards 
which are both representative and effective. 
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SECTION V
The connections between Finnish pension institutions 
and Finland’s corporate and financial sectors: what 
issues does it raise?
Some history
In his 380-page PhD Thesis titled ”Pension Fund Capitalism in Europe: 
Institutional Organization and Governance of Finnish Pension Insurance 
Companies”, Ville-Pekka Sorsa provides a good summary of the evolution of 
the Finnish pension system through the post-WWII decades.26 The following 
points are relevant to the topic of this Section of the Report:
•	 The decades of the 1960s into the 1990s were the ”premium lending” period 
for the PICs, with their main assets in the form of 5 per cent interest loans 
to Finnish borrowers.
•	 The credit quality of these loans declined materially in the late-1980s/early-
1990s.
•	 With the passage of the 1997 pension reforms, PIC investment policies 
began to shift away from lending to Finnish borrowers towards equity 
investing both inside Finland, and abroad. Sorsa characterized this as 
a paradigm shift from supporting national economic development to 
professional international portfolio management. 
•	 Nevertheless, the large PICs continue to be major players in Finland’s 
financial and economic affairs. On the flipside, the large Finnish employers 
also continue to be major players in the governance and financial policies 
of the PICs.
•	 PICs have significant equity holdings in Finland’s major corporations, 
though no major control blocks. At the same time, the PICs continue to 
have home-country corporate loan windows.
•	 The PICs are actively engaged in Finnish corporate governance through 
corporate board nomination processes, and through setting guidelines for 
executive compensation policies. 
26 Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, St. Peter’s College, University of Oxford, 
2010. 
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Recent investment and ownership data for the PICs as well as for KEVA and 
VER from TELA confirm Sorsa’s observations. TELA provided the following 
information for the year 2011:
•	 Total Finnish pension assets were 144B Euros, of which 51B (35%) was in 
public stocks and private equity investments. Of the 51B Euros, 15B (i.e., 
almost 1/3rd) was in listed Finnish stocks (12B) and private Finnish equity 
(3B).
•	 The 12B Euros in listed Finnish stocks held by Finnish pension organizations 
represented 9 per cent of the total value of all Finnish listed stocks in 2011. 
•	 Looking through the aggregate 144B Euros, about 1/3rd was invested in 
Finnish public stocks, private equity, real estate, loans, bonds, and money 
market paper from Finnish issuers.
In short, while Finnish retirement savings may no longer be the primary 
engine of Finnish economic development and asset ownership, it is still a very 
significant force in Finnish finance and economics. 
Current perceptions
The late-September Helsinki interviews and other communications added a 
qualitative dimension to the ’economic and financial ’impact’ question. Here are 
some of the insights offered by Finnish insiders:
•	 The ties between Finland’s corporate sector and the PICs are still close. For 
example, ’block deals’ (i.e., delivering pension business in exchange for the 
PIC providing loans and other financial services to the client) and other 
non-transparent PIC-corporate client transactions still occur.
•	 Finland’s ’power elite’ runs across the pension, labor, corporate, and 
government sectors. There are a lot of ’between friends’ relationships across 
these four sectors. 
•	 The Finnish pension industry is too insular and inward-looking. It would 
benefit from an organization like Denmark’s ATP coming in and shaking 
things up.
•	 There is still too much of a ’we need to use pension capital for economic 
development inside Finland’ mindset in Finland. People should recognize 
that financial markets are now global and that Finland is no longer 
dependent on its own retirement savings for further economic development. 
Finland’s pension capital should be deployed across the globe. 
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While these observations do not necessarily represent majority opinions, I 
believe they are worth serious reflection.
Implications
In my view, Finland’s pensions sector would indeed benefit from making 
conscious decisions to become more outward-looking. For example, thought-
leading pension organizations around the world are developing collaborative 
strategies and networks around originating and developing real estate and 
infrastructure investment opportunities. Similar innovative initiatives are 
underway in areas ranging from pension plan design to redefining fiduciary 
duties to active corporate ownership strategies. Finland’s pension organizations 
should be proactive participants in at least some of these international 
initiatives.27
Section V summary and conclusions
1. The financial and economic connections between Finland’s pension system 
and its economy used to be very close. 
2. In the last 10–15 years, Finnish pension assets have been increasingly 
diversified outside the country. However, even today approximately 1/3rd 
continues to be invested inside Finland. This is a two-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it provides knowledgeable capital inside a relatively small 
country by global standards. On the other, there is also a ’double jeopardy’ 
dimension to it. Because of its 75 per cent ’pay-go’ financing, the health 
of the Finnish pension system already heavily dependent on the health of 
the Finnish economy. This suggests its financial asset buffer should be fully 
invested outside Finland as a diversification strategy.
3. A stronger emphasis on external investing also lessens the risk of political 
interference in how Finnish pension assets are invested. 
4. A more vigorous outward-looking approach to investing Finnish pension 
assets also helps defuse the ongoing perception in some quarters that 
Finland’s corporate and pension sectors are still not ’arms-length’ enough.  
27 Some of these initiatives are more effective than others. Conscious choices will need to be made 
which to join, and which to avoid. 
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SECTION VI
  
In conclusion
I close by once again noting that Finland’s retirement income system is both 
comprehensive and robust. Its design is consensus-driven, covers the entire 
workforce, provides adequate pensions, facilitates worker mobility, and is 
institutionally robust. It would continue to serve Finnish citizens well into 
the future even if nothing was changed. However, there are opportunities to 
simplify the system, raise governance effectiveness, explore global investment 
opportunities, and in the process materially raise asset returns and lower 
investment and benefit administration costs. I encourage Finnish policy makers 
to carefully assess these opportunities, and to capitalize on them to the degree 
that is practically possible.
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Really???
If	 the	 finding	 quoted	 above	 from	 a	 much-cited	
2008	 study	 sponsored	 by	 the	 US-based	 National	
Institute	 on	 Retirement	 Security	 were	 true,	 the	
world	 should	 be	 awash	 in	 DB	 pension	 plans.	 In	
fact,	quite	the	reverse	is	true.	Traditional	employ-
ment-based	 DB	 plans	 are	 rapidly	 becoming	 an	
endangered	 species,	 even	 in	 public	 sector								
contexts,	where	they	have	been	traditionally	been	
the	 pension	 arrangement	 of	 choice.	 	 Below	 we	
argue	that	the	time	has	come	to	stop	defending	the	
indefensible,	and	instead	to	design	and	implement	
21st	 Century	 pension	 arrangements	 that	 pass	 the	
dual	sustainability	test	of	adequacy	and	affordabil-
ity.	This	Letter sets	the	stage	for	this	much-needed	
transition	in	public	discourse.
The	Almeida-Fornia	defense	of	the	traditional	DB	
pension	model	offers	a	good	starting	point	for	our	
quest.	How	did	 they	 arrive	 at	 their	 ‘close	 to	 half	
the	cost’	conclusion?	In	their	own	words,	from	the	
following	three	cost	savings	relative	to	DC	plans:	
 Longevity	risk	pooling	in	a	DB	plan	saves	15%	
 Maintenance	 of	 a	 balanced	 portfolio													
diversification	in	a	DB	plan	saves	5%	
 A	DB	plan’s	 superior	 investment	 performance	
saves	26%	
On	 close	 examination,	 each	 of	 these	 three								
assertions	is	open	to	serious	challenge.	
Pooling Longevity Risk 
Almeida-Fornia	 argue	 that	 by	 pooling	 longevity	
risk	 among	 a	 large	 group	 of	 participants,	 they	
avoid	 the	 ‘over-saving’	 dilemma	 inherent	 in	 DC	
plans.	Risk	pooling	allows	everybody	to	only	save	
enough	money	to	maintain	their	standard	of	living	
to	 average	 life-expectancy,	 rather	 than	maximum	
life-expectancy.	True,	as	far	as	the	argument	goes,	
but	does	it	go	far	enough?	In	our	view,	it	does	not.		
For	 example,	 the	 traditional	 DB	 plan	 forces	 all	
participants	into	a	standard	life	annuity,	starting	at	
the	 retirement	 date.	 Don	 Ezra	 points	 out	 in	 his	
article	“How	Should	Retirees	Manage	Investment	
and	 Longevity	 Risk	 in	 a	 DC	 World?”	 (RIJPM,	
Spring	 2011)	 that	 standard	 life	 annuities	 are	 in	
fact	unpopular	with	many	retirees.	Why?	Because	
many	 retirees	 don’t	 want	 to	 tie	 up	 all	 of	 their				
retirement	 savings	 in	 an	 irrevocable,	 inflexible	
blended	 contract	 that	 is	 partially	 a	 bond	 and					
partially	 longevity	 insurance.	 Most	 would	 prefer	
to	 keep	 these	 two	 instruments	 separate,	 with	 the	
longevity	insurance	only	covering	the	contingency	
that	 a	 retiree	 lives	 longer	 than	 her	 or	 his	 life					
expectancy.	
The	key	point	here	 is	 that	 the	availability	of,	and	
access	to,	longevity	insurance	is	not	contingent	on	
membership	 in	 a	 traditional	 DB	 pension	 plan.	 It	
can	 also	 be	 engineered	 to	 be	 part	 of	 any	 capital	
accumulation	 plan,	 either	 through	 self-insurance	
THE DYSFUNCTIONAL ‘DB vs. DC’ DEBATE: 
WHY AND HOW TO MOVE BEYOND IT 
              “We find that a DB pension plan can offer the same retirement benefit at close 
to half the cost of a DC retirement savings plan....” 
																																							
From	“A	Better	Bang	for	the	Buck:		
The	Economic	Efficiencies	of	Defined	Benefit	Pension	Plans”	
By	Beth	Almeida	and	William	Fornia,	FSA	
June 2012
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among	 the	 participants,	 or	 through	 a	 third-party			
insurer.							
Maintaining Portfolio Balance 
Almeida-Fornia	argue	that	“because	DB	plans	do	not	
age...they	 are	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 enhanced	
returns	 that	 come	 from	 a	 balanced	 portfolio	 over	
long	periods	of	time.”	There	are	two	problems	with	
this	assertion.	First,	DB	plans	can,	and	do	age.	Many	
DB	plans	have	 in	 fact	 seen	 their	 ratio	of	 retirees	 to	
actives	 rise	 in	 recent	 years,	 with	 further	 increases	
projected	 in	 the	 years	 ahead.	 Second,	 ironically,	 at	
the	 time	 Almeida	 and	 Fornia	 were	 writing	 their	
study	 (i.e.,	 in	 2008),	 many	 DB	 plans	 were	 selling	
rather	than	buying	risk	assets	into	falling	markets	as	
they	attempted	to	slow	the	declines	in	their	funding	
ratios.
Now	contrast	these	DB	plan	realities	with	those	of	a	
hybrid	 plan	 with	 separate	 payment-certainty	 and		
return-seeking	instruments	(e.g.,	a	TIAA-CREF-type	
plan).	The	hybrid	plan	participants	have	exposure	to	
both	instruments,	with	younger	participants	favoring	
return-seeking	exposure	and	older	participants	favor-
ing	payment	certainty	exposure.	Arguably,	assuming	
equal	management	competence	in	the	two	plans,	the	
hybrid	 plan	 participants	 are	 in	 no	 worse	 financial	
shape	 today	 than	 participants	 in	 traditional	 DB	
plans.	 They	may	 even	 be	 in	 better	 financial	 shape,	
depending	 on	 who	 is	 underwriting	 the	 DB	 plan				
unfunded	liability.					
Superior Investment Returns 
Almeida-Fornia	argue	that	the	biggest	DB	plan	cost	
reducer	is	their	ability	to	earn	higher	returns	than	DC	
plans.	 They	 attribute	 this	 outperformance	 to						
economies	of	scale,	lower	fees,	and	the	professional	
management	of	plan	assets.	At	first	glance,	Table	1	
appears	 to	 support	 their	 ‘higher	 returns’	 assertion,	
with	 the	 average	 realized	DB	 fund	 return	 at	 8.26%	
vs.	 a	 7.08%	average	 for	 the	DC	 funds.	The	data	 in	
the	 table	 comes	 from	 the	CEM	Benchmarking	 Inc.	
database,	 and	 indicates	 average	 annual	 experience	
for	all	US	DB	and	DC	funds	in	the	database	between	
1997	and	2010.	
However,	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 Table	 1	 reveals	 some			
interesting	 details.	 The	 average	 gross	 return	 differ-
ence	 is	 entirely	 due	 to	 differences	 in	 average	 asset	
mix	 exposures	 (i.e.,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	 average			
Policy	Returns)	between	DB	and	DC	funds	over	the	
period.	 Maybe	 surprising	 to	 some,	 the	 average					
investment	costs	for	DC	funds	is	actually	lower	than	
that	 for	 DB	 funds	 over	 the	 period.	 On	 a	 Net									
Value-Added	basis,	DB	and	DC	funds	ended	up	in	a	
virtual	 tie,	 indicating	 no	 material	 differences	 in				
average	management	skills	between	the	two	types	of	
pension	 arrangements.	 Table	 2	 explains	 the	 reason	
why	 DB	 funds	 had	 both	 higher	 average	 policy					
returns	and	investment	costs	over	the	14-year	period.	
They	 had	 a	 combined	 weight	 of	 7%	 in	 the	 high					
return-high	cost	Real	Estate	and	Private	Equity	asset	
classes	 versus	 0%	 for	 DC	 funds.	 In	 contrast	 DC	
funds	 had	 an	 average	 weight	 of	 19%	 in	 the	 low					
return-low	 cost	 Stable	Value	 asset	 class	 versus	 0%	
for	DB	funds.	
So	what	do	Tables	1	and	2	tell	us?	That	the	average	
DB-DC	 return-difference	 in	 the	 CEM	 database				
originated	 solely	 from	 the	 average	 weighting							
differences	in	Private	Markets	vs.	Stable	Value.	Are	
these	 differences	 inherent	 to	 the	 DB	 vs.	 DC									
formulas?	 Or	 did	 they	 simply	 arise	 because	 of					
traditional	 ‘we’ve	 always	 done	 it	 this	 way’								
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Table 1:  DB versus DC Return and Value Added—U.S. 
Source: CEM Benchmarking, Inc. (2011) 
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mindsets?	We	vote	for	the	latter.	Hybrid	plans	such	
as	 TIAA-CREF	 have	 long	 been	 private	 markets			
participants,	as	have	the	DC-based	Australian	super	
funds.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Stable	 Value	 option	
seems	 to	 be	 a	 passing	 oddity	 in	 the	US	DC	 space.	
Also,	 the	 surprisingly	 low	 DC	 cost	 experience	
comes	from	the	dominance	in	the	CEM	database	of	
large	401(k)	plans	with	significant	passive	manage-
ment	 components.	 Again,	 the	 point	 is	 that	 factors	
other	than	‘DB	vs.	DC’	determine	cost	experience.															
The Dark Side of DB 
The	fact	that	each	of	Almeida-Fornia’s	three	‘DB	vs.	
DC’	 cost-reducing	 assertions	 is	 open	 to	 serious		
challenge	is	not	the	end	of	the	story.	The	“How	DB	
plans	 work”	 section	 of	 their	 study	 offers	 a	 far	 too	
simplistic,	 idealistic	 narrative,	 implying	 that	 DB	
plans	represent	complete,	 fair,	explainable	contracts	
between	 retirees,	 employees,	 and	 employers.	 In	 the	
real	world,	this	is	seldom	the	case.	DB	contracts	are	
often	not	complete,	not	fair	between	all	stakeholder	
groups,	 and	 too	 complex	 for	 mere	 mortals	 to								
understand.	
For	example,	 the	value	of	 the	guarantees	embedded	
in	 DB	 contracts	 is	 often	 understated	 by	 using							
discount	 rates	 that	 embody	 the	 assumption	 that				
projected	 risk	 premiums	 will	 become	 realized	 risk	
premiums.	 In	 game	 theory	 terms,	 this	 is	 a											
mechanism	 for	 shifting	 wealth	 to	 current	 plan							
participants	 from	 whoever	 is	 underwriting	 the						
embedded	 payment	 guarantees.	 These	 ‘paper’	
wealth	 transfers	 are	 eventually	 realized	 through				
demands	 that	 benefits	 be	 increased	 in	 the	 good	
times,	 and	 by	 enforcing	 the	 embedded	 payment	
guarantees	 unwittingly	 made	 by	 guarantors	 in	 the	
bad	 times.	 The	 seriously	 underfunded	 condition	 of	
many	 public	 sector	 plans	 today	 is	 finally	 forcing	
public	 sector	 employers	 to	 recognize	 these												
fundamental	 design	 problems	 of	 traditional	 DB	
plans.	 Finally,	 a	 serious	 quest	 for	 sustainable	 21st
Century	pension	designs	that	balance	the	dual	goals	
of	 adequacy	 and	 affordability	 in	 an	 explainable			
manner	has	begun.	
Principles of Sustainable Pension Design 
So	what	 does	 a	 sustainable	 21st	 Century	 retirement	
income	 system	 design	 look	 like?	 To	 start,	 it	 must	
meet	 the	 dual	 tests	 of	 pension	 adequacy	 and	 cost	
affordability.	 At	 the	 broad	 macro	 level,	 these	 two	
goals	 are	 achieved	 through	 a	 balanced	 3-pillar				
structure	 (i.e.,	 universal,	 employment-based,	 and	
individual/family-based	 pillars).	 At	 more	 granular	
micro	 levels,	 the	 size	 and	 design	 of	 each	 of	 these	
pillars	 plays	 out	 differently	 in	 different	 countries.	
While	 this	 Letter focuses	 on	 retirement	 systems’	
employment-based	 pillar,	 the	 importance	 of	 how	
well	 (or	 poorly)	 this	 Pillar	 2	 is	 integrated	with	 the	
universal	 Pillar	 1	 (e.g.,	 old	 age	 pension)	 and									
individual/family-based	Pillar	3	(e.g.,	IRAs,	RRSPs)	
should	not	be	underestimated.	
So	a	series	of	key	design	questions	for	21st	Century	
Pillar	 2	 (i.e.,	 employment-based)	 pension	 plans	
might	be:	
 Taking	 the	 role	 of	 the	 universal	 Pillar	 1	 into		
account,	what	 proportion	 of	 a	worker’s	 income	
should	the	Pillar	2	plan	target	to	replace?	
 How	much	is	the	employee/employer	willing	to	
pay	to	achieve	that	target	pension?	
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 What	 is	 a	 reasonable	 prospective	 net	 real						
investment	 return	 that	 can	 be	 assumed	 on	 a		
conservatively-invested	 portfolio	 of	 retirement	
savings	today?	What	additional	reward	for	risk-
taking	is	it	reasonable	to	project?	
 What	 respective	 lengths	 of	 the	 work	 and							
post-work	periods	should	be	assumed	in	funding	
the	plan?	How	is	 retirement	age	 flexibility	best	
built	into	the	plan	design?		
 To	what	 degree,	 and	 how,	 should	 uncertainties	
about	 net	 real	 returns,	 inflation,	 and	 longevity	
be	mitigated?	If	the	plan	offers	guarantees,	what	
are	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 these					
guarantees	are	priced	and	enforced?	
The	 Tinbergen	 Principle	 that	 the	 number	 of	 policy	
goals	must	 equal	 the	 number	 of	 policy	 instruments	
required	 to	 achieve	 them	 is	 helpful	 at	 this	 point.	 If	
the	 two	 fundamental	 goals	 of	 the	 pension	 plan	 are	
adequacy	 and	 affordability,	 then	 two	 instruments	
will	be	required	to	achieve	them.	
Two Goals, Two Instruments
The	 nature	 and	 shape	 of	 the	 two	 pension	 policy			
instruments	 follow	 logically	 from	 the	 two	 policy	
goals	they	have	been	assigned	to	achieve.	The	focus	
of	achieving	the	adequacy	goal	should	be	retirement	
savings	 sufficiency	 and	 life-time	payment	 certainty	
as	workers	transition	to	the	post-work	phase	of	their	
lives.	 So	 the	 key	 capabilities	 of	 the	 adequacy							
instrument	 are	 to	 convert	 accumulated	 retirement	
savings	 pools	 into	 regular	 payment	 streams	 to						
retirees,	and	 to	price	and	offer	 longevity	 insurance.	
The	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 adequacy	 instrument		
constitutes	 a	 reasonably	 matched	 balance	 sheet	 of	
assets	 and	 liabilities,	 with	 sufficient	 risk	 capital	 to	
ensure	payment	certainty.				
In	 contrast,	 the	 focus	of	 achieving	 the	affordability	
goal	 is	 to	 generate	 the	 highest	 possible	 return	 on	
accumulating	 retirement	 savings	 without	 taking		
undue	risks.	So	the	key	capability	of	the	affordabil-
ity	 instrument	 is	 entrepreneurial	 investment						
prowess....to	 create	 genuine	 wealth	 with	 the								
retirement	 savings	 under	 management.	 The	 key			
people	managing	this	instrument	are	not	(in	Keynes’	
words)	 ‘beauty	 contest’	 investors	who	 trade	 pieces	
of	 paper	with	 each	other.	 Instead,	 their	 private	 and	
public	markets	activities	are	both	geared	to	generat-
ing	growing,	sustainable,	re-investible	cash-flows.						
The 21st Century Pension Institution 
Note	 how	 both	 the	 plan	 design	 questions	 and	 the	
implications	 of	 the	 Tinbergen	 principle	 signal	 a		
critical	requirement	for	integrative	thinking,	and	for	
dynamic	modeling,	communications,	and	implemen-
tation	 expertise	 to	 pull	 all	 these	 elements	 together.	
In	 short,	 21st	 Century	 pension	 plan	 designs	 require	
21st	 Century	 pension	 institutions.	 Letter readers	
know	pension	institution	design	is	a	regular	topic	in	
this	publication	(see,	for	example,	our	March	Letter
contrasting	 the	 Norway,	 Yale,	 and	 Canada											
Investment	Models).		
Suffice	it	here	to	say	that	we	agree	with	the	Almeida
-Fornia	 assertion	 that	 organizational	 effectiveness	
matters	 a	 great	 deal	 in	 the	 global	 pensions	 space.	
Modern	 pension	 institutions	 integrate	 effortlessly	
across	 the	 disciplines	 of	 pension	 finance,	 corporate	
finance,	 human	 behavior,	 investment	 beliefs,	 risk	
management,	 stakeholder	 communications,	 and		
information	technology.	They	are	well-governed	by	
Boards	that	have	the	right	skill-experience	sets,	and	
have	 a	 ‘public	 good’	 mindset	 at	 the	 same	 time.	
Modern	 pension	 institutions	 have	 scale,	 and	 can	
compete	 for	 the	 internal	 talent	 they	 need	 to	 be					
high-performance	organizations.							
Once	 again,	 we	 make	 the	 obvious	 point	 that	 the	
presence	 or	 absence	 of	 these	 institutional	 features	
has	nothing	to	do	with	whether	the	underlying	plan	
design	is	DB	or	DC.	
													
Moving Beyond the ‘DB vs. DC’ Debate 
By	 now	 the	 key	 message	 of	 this	 Letter should	 be	
obvious.	 We	 can	 no	 longer	 spend	 precious	 time			
debating	 pension	 plan	 designs	 that	 are	 well	 past	
their	 ‘best	 before’	 due	 dates.	 Fresh	 thinking	 brings	
the	fresh	design	insights	the	pensions	sectors	around	
the	world	desperately	need.	Let’s	get	on	with	it!					
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In Search of Effective Pension Management 
We	 are	 a	 strong	 proponent	 of	 ‘deductive’									
discovery	 processes.	 Such	 processes	 start	 with	
basic	truths	or	principles	and	reason	towards	their	
operational	 implications.	 Then	 these	 operational	
implications	are	subjected	to	the	‘reality	check’	of	
empirical	 confirmation.	 Readers	 have	 seen	 the	
application	 of	 this	 process	 to	 the	 discovery	 and	
validity-confirmation	 of	 the	 five	 drivers	 of							
effective	 pension	management	 on	more	 than	 one	
occasion:
1.	 Arms-length,	interests-aligned,	legal	platform	
2.	 Good	organization	governance	
3.	 Sensible	investment	beliefs	
4.	 Right-scaled	
5.	 Able	to	attract	and	retain	the	right	people	
This Letter stands	 that	 deductive	 discovery	 pro-
cess	on	its	head	by	going	‘inductive’.	Specifically,	
we	start	by	identifying	two	pension	organizations	
that	 have	 developed	 reputations	 for	 exceptional	
performance	and	competence	in	recent	years,	and	
ask	why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	The	 resulting	discovery	
process	 uncovers	 the	 key	 success	 drivers	 that			
these	two	organizations	have	in	common.	Through	
this Letter, we	 invite	 you	 to	 join	 our	 search	 for,	
and	discovery	of,	 the	drivers	of	effective	pension	
management	 through	 the	 cases	 of	 ATP and
HOOPP. 
The	 full	 names	 of	 the	 two	 organizations	 are	The
Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension 
Plan	 (ATP)	 and	 the	 Healthcare of Ontario      
Pension Plan	 (HOOPP).	 In	 an	 important	 sense,	
the	 two	 short	 quotes	 lifted	 from	 their	 Annual				
Reports	(see	above)	identify	the	most	fundamental	
common	 success	 driver	 of	 all:	 a	 clear	 statement	
that	 the	primary	mission	of	 the	organization	 is	 to	
provide	 post-work	 financial	 security	 for	 its				
members.	 However,	 many	 pension	 organizations	
say	 this	 is	 their	mission.	How	do	we	 test	 if	 they	
really	 mean	 it?	 Logically,	 by	 addressing	 three	
questions.
First,	 is	 the	 pension	 design	 the	 organization	 is		
implementing	sustainable?	In	other	words,	what	is	
the	nature	of	the	pension	promise	and	is	it	deliver-
able	in	both	the	shorter	and	longer	terms?	Second,	
does	 the	 organization	 possess	 the	 resources						
necessary	 to	 get	 the	 job	 done?	 And	 third,	 is	 the	
organization	 producing	 actual	 results	 consistent	
with	its	vision/mission?		We	address	each	of	these	
three	questions	 in	 turn.	The	Letter ends	with	five	
implications	 of	 the	 ATP and HOOPP lessons	
learned	 for	 fiduciary	manager	 organizations	with	
multiple	pension	plan	and	other	clients.						
Sustainable Pension Designs? 
ATP’s	pension	design	falls	in	the	‘Collective	DC’	
category.	 The	 keys	 to	 its	 sustainability	 are	 (a)		
EFFECTIVE PENSION MANAGEMENT: 
THE CASES OF ATP AND HOOPP
“ATP’s vision is to ensure basic financial 
security for all of Denmark....”   
ATP	Annual	Report,	2011                      
“HOOPP’s  liability-driven investment 
approach is designed with the sole
purpose of delivering on the pension 
promise....”                                                          
                                       
HOOPP	Annual	Report,	2011	
July 2012
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provide	a	pension	guaranty	on	only	80	cents	for	eve-
ry	dollar	contributed,	(b)	hedge	that	guaranty	with	a	
series	 of	 matching	 financial	 instruments,	 and	 (c)		
invest	 the	assets	not	needed	to	support	 the	guaranty	
in	 a	 portfolio	 of	 risk-controlled,	 return-seeking				
investment	strategies.	Subject	to	maintaining	a	target	
20%	balance	sheet	risk	buffer,	the	proceeds	from	the	
return-seeking	 strategies	 are	 used	 to	 enhance	 the	
basic	guaranteed	pension.	Note	this	design	meets	the	
Tinbergen	Test	that	the	achievement	of	two	pension	
plan	goals	(i.e.,	affordability	and	payment	certainty)	
requires	 two	 instruments	 (i.e.,	 a	 liability-hedging	
portfolio	and	a	return-seeking	portfolio).	
HOOPP’s	 pension	 design	 falls	 in	 the	 ‘Collective	
Target	Benefit’	category.	The	keys	to	its	sustainabil-
ity	 are	 (a)	 a	 regulatory	 regime	 that	 requires	 regular	
testing	 of	 balance	 sheet	 solvency	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
target	 benefit,	 (b)	 recognition	 by	 HOOPP’s
Supervisory	Board	that	there	are	no	external	pension	
guarantors,	 (c)	Board	power	 (subject	 to	 stakeholder	
agreement)	 to	 adjust	 both	 contribution	 rates	 and		
benefits	to	maintain	balance	sheet	solvency,	and	(d)	
an	explicit	 split	of	plan	assets	 into	 liability-hedging	
and	 return-seeking	 components.	 So	 HOOPP’s
pension	design	too	passes	the	Tinbergen	Test.	
Resources to Get the Job Done? 
Why	are	both	the	ATP and HOOPP pension	designs	
sustainable?	 Because	 both	 have	 explicit	 solvency	
targets	 that	 they	 manage	 to,	 and	 mechanisms	 to			
dynamically	 monitor	 and	 steer	 the	 plan’s	 solvency	
ratio	 (i.e.,	 the	 balance	 sheet	A/L	 ratio)	 in	 the	 right	
direction	over	time.	Specifically,	they	have	tools	that	
dynamically	 monitor	 the	 duration	 and	 inflation-
sensitivity	 of	 the	 accrued	 and	 accruing	 pension				
payment	obligations,	monitor	overall	A/L	mismatch	
risk,	 decompose	 it	 into	 its	 major	 components,	 and	
have	trigger	mechanisms	for	making	adjustments	in	
real	time,	if	needed.		
These	 return	 and	 risk	 monitoring	 and	management	
requirements	 have	 profound	 organizational
implications	 in	 both	 design	 and	 requisite	 skill	 sets.	
The	complex	data/information	needs	lead	directly	to	
IT,	finance,	and	risk	measurement	and	management	
functions	 that	 can	 cope	 with	 that	 complexity.	 The	
need	for	separate	hedging	and	return-seeking	portfo-
lios	 has	 already	 been	 noted.	 Skilled,	 dedicated				
people	 must	 be	 found	 to	 manage	 each	 of	 these				
portfolios	 and	 their	 components	 (including	 the					
accompanying	 in-	 vs.	 outsourcing	 decisions).						
Similarly,	the	administration	of	benefits	and	member	
communication	 is	 an	 exacting	 business.	 A	 CEO	
must	be	found	that	‘gets’	both	 the	pension	business	
model	and	the	need	to	produce	the	desired	results	in	
practice.	 A	 Supervisory	 Board	 must	 be	 assembled	
that	fully	appreciates	the	need	for	both	a	sustainable	
pension	 design	 and	 effective	 implementation							
strategies.		
The ATP and	 the	 HOOPP Annual	 Reports	 offer	
strong	evidence	that	both	organizations	have	indeed	
assembled	 the	 complex	bundle	 of	 resources	 needed	
to	get	the	job	done.	Specifically,	ATP reports	a	total	
of	 794	 FTEs	 on	 staff,	 and	HOOPP 450,	with	 both	
organizations	winning	‘best	employer’	awards.	Rela-
tive	 to	 their	 net	 asset	 bases	 of	 $100B	 and	 $40B				
respectively,	 ATP reports	 investment	 expenses	 of	
24bps	and	pension	administration	expenses	of	6bps.	
HOOPP reports	 23bps	 and	 10bps	 for	 these	 two				
categories.	 As	 a	 standard	 of	 comparison,	 CEM
Benchmarking Inc. reports	median	global	experience	
for	 investment	and	pension	administration	expenses	
in	the	50bps	and	10bps	areas	respectively.				
Actual Results?					
There	 are	 two	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 organizational				
performances	 of	ATP and HOOPP have	 stood	 out	
over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 last	 five	 years:	 in	 balance	
sheet	 performance	 and	 in	 asset	 return	 performance.	
Ultimately,	balance	sheet	performance	matters	most.	
Table	 1	 displays	 the	 key	 indicator	 of	 the	 pension														
organization’s	 ability	 to	 meet	 the	 accrued	 pension	
promises:	 the	 funded	 ratios	 of	 their	 balance	 sheets	
(i.e.,	assets	as	a	percent	of	liabilities)	over	the	2007-
2011	 period.	 	 Note	 that	 while	 the	 2008	 global						
financial	markets	debacle	did	pull	down	 the	 funded	
ratios	in	both	organizations,	it	did	not	sink	them	into	
unrecoverable	 territory.	 Today,	 ATP and HOOPP 
(and	 more	 importantly,	 their	 plan	 members)	 find	
themselves	 in	 a	 small,	 elite	 group	 of	 pension								
organizations	 with	 funded	 ratios	 exceeding	 100%.		
(For	 example,	 median	 funded	 ratios	 in	 North				
America	 have	 fallen	 into	 the	 75%	 area,	 and	 the				
median	 Dutch	 plan	 funded	 ratio	 has	 fallen	 below	
100%	versus	a	125%	target).	
Table 1   ATP and HOOPP Funded Ratios        
Experience – 2007 to 2011 
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 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
ATP 126% 113% 118% 117% 115% 
HOOPP 104% 90% 97% 103% 108% 
Sources: Calculated by the author from data in the ATP
and HOOPP 2011 Annual Reports 
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Table	2	offers	the	key	explanation	why	the	ATP and
HOOPP balance	 sheets	 held	 up	 so	 well	 over	 the	
course	of	the	last	five	years:	strong	asset	returns.	In	
short,	 their	 5-year	 return	 experience	was	materially	
better	than	that	of	most	other	pension	funds.		Why?	
Knowledgeable	 readers	 will	 know	 the	 answer.	
Through	 their	 liability	hedging	 activities,	 both	ATP 
and HOOPP were	long	interest	rate	duration	during	
a	period	of	dramatically	falling	bond	yields,	provid-
ing	 material	 capital	 appreciation	 offsets	 to	 the					
generally	 poor	 returns	 on	 equities.	 Note	 that	 these	
capital	appreciation	offsets	resulted	from	investment	
prudence,	not	investment	brilliance.	The	interest	rate	
exposures	on	the	asset	side	of	the	balance	sheet	were	
there	 to	 hedge	 against	 equivalent	 interest	 rate							
exposures	 in	 accrued	 pension	 liabilities.	 On	 a						
cautionary	note,	 it	 is	difficult	 today	 to	see	 the	yield	
curve	falling	materially	further.	Locking	in	low	bond	
returns	 by	 shifting	 asset	 mix	 exposure	 further						
towards	 bonds	 could	 now	 be	 a	 return-reducing,				
rather	than	a	return-enhancing	strategy.		
An	interesting	difference	between	the	two	organiza-
tions	 is	 that	 in	 HOOPP’s	 case,	 the	 liability-hedge	
portfolio	contains	most	of	its	physical	assets	and	the	
return-seeking	 portfolio	 is	 mainly	 derivatives-	
based. ATP	has	done	the	reverse.	Its	liability-hedge	
portfolio	is	derivatives-based,	and	its	return-seeking	
portfolio	 holds	 its	 physical	 assets.	 This	 is	 likely			
because	 Canada	 does	 not	 have	 a	 well-developed	
long-dated	 interest	 rate	 swap	 market,	 so	 HOOPP
uses	 its	 physical	 assets	 to	 hedge	 its	 interest	 rate				
duration	 risk.	 In	 both	 the	ATP and HOOPP cases,	
these	 liability-hedging	 strategies	 can	 lead	 to	 the	
counter-intuitive	 result	 of	 being	 levered	 in	 a									
financial	sense	(e.g.,	long	bonds	and	short	cash),	but	
risk-reducing	in	a	balance	sheet	mismatch	sense.		
Return-Seeking Strategies 
The	 2011	Annual	 Reports	 offer	 evidence	 that	ATP 
and HOOPP have	 also	 been	 successful	 investors	
with	their	return-seeking	portfolios.	In	line	with	their	
focus	on	balance	sheet	risk	control,	the	organizations	
have	 structured	 their	 return-seeking	 investment			
programs	into	the	groupings	set	out	in	Table	3.	Note	
that	 both	 organizations	 have	moved	 away	 from	 the	
traditional	 asset	 class	 categorization	 of	 investment	
policy,	towards	a	more	economics-based	approach	to	
measuring	 and	 managing	 the	 collective	 risk									
exposures	of	the	return-seeking	strategies.
An	important	element	of	this	shift	has	been	to	make	
major	investments	in	risk	management	tools	in	order	
to	 estimate	 the	 diversification	 power	 within	 the			
return-seeking	 investment	 program,	 and	 to	 estimate	
the	 remaining	 net	 risk	 exposure	 that	 the	 program	
contributes	 to	 the	 plan	 balance	 sheet.	 With	 these	
overall	risk	monitoring	and	management	disciplines	
in	 place,	 the	 investment	 specialist	 teams	 in	 both			
organizations	are	encouraged	to	generate	net	excess	
returns	on	the	risk	capital	allocated	to	them.	In	both	
cases,	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 return-seeking	 investment	
strategies	 are	 managed	 inside	 the	 organization,				
rather	than	outsourced	to	external	managers.		
Table 3  Components of the ATP and 
HOOPP Return-Seeking Strategies
Sources: the ATP and HOOPP 2011 Annual Reports 
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1. Interest Rates, 2. Credit, 3. Equities, 4. Inflation, 
5. Commodities, 6. Alpha 
1. Credit, 2. Public Equity, 3. Private Equity,           
4. Asset Allocation, 5. Absolute Return, 6. Options           
ATP:
HOOPP:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
ATP -2.6% 18.8% 2.0% 17.2% 26.2% 
Median-Euro 4.5% -12.6% 14.4% 11.6% 3.7% 
HOOPP 6.2% -12.0% 15.2% 13.7% 12.2% 
Median-Cdn 2.8% -16.5% 15.1% 11.0% 2.6% 
5 Year  
Annualized 
11.8%
3.9%
6.6%
2.4%
Table 2   ATP and HOOP Investment Returns vs. Euro and Canadian 
Median Pension Fund  Experience – 2007 to 2011 
Sources: the ATP and HOOPP 2011 Annual Reports and CEM Benchmarking Inc.   
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Lessons for ‘Fiduciary Managers’ 
In	 our	 view,	 an	 important	 element	 in	 the	ATP and
HOOPP success	stories	is	their	ability	to	focus	on	a	
single	 pension	 design	 and	 a	 single,	 well-defined	
‘client’	 group.	 This	 raises	 an	 important	 question.	
What	 lessons	 should	 ‘fiduciary	manager’	 organiza-
tions	looking	after	the	financial	interests	of	multiple	
client	groups	with	multiple	types	of	pension	or	other	
liability	structures	take	away	from	these	two	stories?	
Examples	 of	 such	 organizations	 include	 QIC in		
Australia, SWIB, Florida SBA, and Commonfund in	
the	 USA,	 Hermes	 in	 the	 UK,	 APG, PGGM, MN   
Services in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 bcIMC, AIMCO, 
and La Caisse in	 Canada.	 A	 large	 new	 Ontario-
based	fiduciary				manager	might	launch	as	early	as	
next	 year.	 The	 size	 and	 importance	 of	 these									
organizations	 suggests	 the	 question	 we	 pose	 is	 an	
important	one,	worth	careful	attention	and	thought.				
It	 seems	 to	 us	 that	 the	most	 important	 lesson	 from	
the ATP and HOOPP stories	 may	 well	 be	 that					
fiduciary	 managers	 serve	 their	 clients	 best	 by						
anchoring	 their	 ‘value	 proposition’	 broadly	 on				
helping	 their	 clients	 achieve	 their	 financial	 goals,	
rather	than	focusing	more	narrowly	on	achieving	or	
surpassing	 some	 investment	 return	 target.	 This	
broader	 perspective	 has	 at	 least	 five	 practical							
implications:		
1.	 An	effective	fiduciary	manager	helps	 its	clients	
define	their	financial	goals	in	ways	that	translate	
into	 the	 financial	 characteristics	 of	 a	 ‘liability-
hedging’	 portfolio	 that	 makes	 the	 achievement	
of	those	financial	goals	as	likely	as	is	reasonably	
possible.
2.	 An	effective	 fiduciary	manager	has	 the	 internal	
capability	 to	 actually	 create	 and	 manage	 as	
many	‘liability-hedging’	portfolios	through	time	
as	are	needed	to	serve	its	clients.	
3.	 An	 effective	 fiduciary	 manager	 can	 reach		
agreement	 with	 each	 client	 on	 the	 maximum	
amount	of	mismatch	risk	relative	to	the	‘liability
-hedging’	 portfolio	 (or	 risk-budget)	 acceptable	
to	 the	 client,	 and	 on	 the	 minimum	 ‘expected	
return-on-risk’	 (or	 hurdle	 rate)	 required	 for			
assets	to	be	placed	‘at	risk’.	
4.	 An	effective	 fiduciary	manager	has	 the	 internal	
capability	 to	 manage	 a	 competitive												
‘return-seeking’	 investment	program	capable	of	
dynamically	 converting	 available	 risk	 budgets	
into	 investment	 returns	 that,	over	 time,	meet	or	
surpass	 the	 pre-established	 hurdle	 rates	 of					
return.	This	 risk-integrated	 investment	 program	
is	capable	of	operating	 in	both	public	 (physical	
and	derivatives)	and	private	market	places.	
5.	 An	effective	fiduciary	manager	has	the	requisite	
governance,	executive,	professional,	administra-
tive,	 and	 IT	 resources	 to	 deliver	 its	 value						
proposition.	
Ending Back Where We Started 
We	 started	 this	 Letter by	 stating	 a	 preference	 for	
deductive	 discovery	 processes	 over	 inductive	 ones.		
Most	of	the	rest	of	the	Letter made	the	counterpoint	
that	 starting	 with	 pension	 management	 success					
stories	 and	 then	 discovering	 the	 ‘whys’	 behind	 the	
successes	 has	 its	 own	 merits.	 In	 the	 end,	 both						
discovery	 journeys	 confirm	 the	 key	 success									
ingredients	of	effective	pension	organizations	 to	be	
aligned	 interests,	 good	 governance,	 sensible								
investment	 beliefs,	 and	 marshalling	 the	 requisite	
resources.			
However,	for	us	at	least,	the	story	approach	taken	in	
this Letter does	result	in	an	additional	insight:	never	
underestimate	 the	 role	 of	 mission	 clarity	 in								
powering	 organizational	 success.	 Achieving								
financial	security	 for	plan	members	was	 the	clearly	
stated	 goal	 of	 both	 the	 ATP and HOOPP              
organizations.	 Their	 funded	 ratios	 suggest	 that,	 to	
date	at	least,	that	is	what	they	are	in	fact	achieving.		
Appendices
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DC Pension Plans that Serve Real People 
The	masthead	of	 this	publication	sets	out	 its	dual	
goals.	 To	 foster	 “Sustainable	 Pension															
Design...and...Effective	 Pension	 Management”.	
And	 of	 course,	 while	 distinct,	 the	 two	 goals	 are	
inextricably	 linked.	 The	 study	 in	 last	 month’s		
Letter of	the	cases	of	ATP and HOOPP made	that	
very	 clear.	 Both	 pension	 organizations	 demon-
strated	 their	 understanding	 that	 delivering								
post-work	income	security	 to	members	requires	a	
sustainable	 pension	 formula	 and	 an	 organization	
that	 can	 reliably	 implement	 it.	We	 continue	 that	
theme	 in	 this	 Letter, though	 from	 a	 distinctly			
different	vantage	point.	
That	different	vantage	point	 is	best	understood	in	
the	 context	 of	what	we	 called	 “the	 dysfunctional	
DB	vs.	DC	debate”	in	the	prior	June	Letter. There
we	argued	that	the	traditional	DB	and	DC	pension	
formulas	both	have	serious	shortcomings,	and	that	
we	need	to	move	to	new	pension	formulas	fit	 for	
the	 21st	 Century.	 Such	 formulas	 must	 recognize	
that	 the	days	of	hard	guarantees	by	credit-worthy	
outside	 parties	 embedded	 in	 traditional	DB	plans	
are	 fast	 disappearing.	 But	 these	 formulas	 must	
also	keep	 the	ultimate	post-work	 income	security	
goal	clearly	in	mind,	which	has	not	been	the	case	
in	most	traditional	DC	plans.	
In short,	 this	 Letter addresses	 the	 challenge	 of	
turning	 traditional	 DC	 frogs	 into	 21st	 Century		
Pension	Prince	Charmings.		    
    
Powerful Global Impact Potential 
A	 successful	 DC	 frog-to-prince	 transformation	
would	 have	 a	 powerful	 global	 impact	 on	 post-
work	 income	 security.	 Pension	 arrangements	 in	
the	developing	world	are	far	more	likely	to	be	DC
-	 rather	 than	 DB-based.	 Supplementary	 pension	
arrangements	in	many	non-Anglo-Saxon	countries	
are	 taking	 on	 DC-flavors.	 In	 the	 Anglo-Saxon	
countries,	most	large	private	sector	large	employ-
ers	 have	 already	 abandoned	 traditional	DB	 plans	
and	even	public	sector	employers	are	recognizing	
they	 must	 move	 in	 that	 direction.	 Further,	 as			
Senator	Harkin	 notes	 (see	 above),	 the	 employees	
of	 smaller	 employers	 and	 the	 self-employed	 are	
largely	left	to	fend	for	themselves	in	the	USA.		
The	Senator	argues	for	a	sensible	USA Retirement 
Funds collective	 action	 solution	 (details	 to	 be		
determined).	 Canada	 is	 now	 in	 its	 third	 year			
TURNING DC FROGS INTO PENSION PRINCE CHARMINGS: 
BUILDING DC PLANS THAT SERVE REAL PEOPLE 
August 2012
“The current system is not working for 
many people. The root problem is that the 
USA has never had a coherent plan for a 
universal private retirement system. That 
is why I am proposing something new – 
USA Retirement Funds....If you have any 
ideas or suggestions, please contact 
me…”
Statement	by	Senator	Tom	Harkin,		
August	2012		
“Our goal is for QSUPER trustees to  
exercise their fiduciary authority to best 
assist plan members in first accumulating 
assets, and then to help them transition to 
maintain an adequate income in          
retirement...”
Statement	by	Australian	superfund	QSUPER,	
July	2012	
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grappling	 with	 the	 design	 of	 its	 PRPP (Pooled    
Registered Pension Plan) ‘solution’.	 The	 UK	 is			
materially	further	along	on	the	road	to	higher	private	
sector	 pension	 coverage	 rates	with	NEST (National 
Employment Savings Trust) now	beginning	to	accept	
and	 invest	 payroll	 deductions.	 Australia	 and	 New	
Zealand	are	further	along	still	with	 the	operation	of	
the KiwiSaver plan	since	2007	in	New	Zealand,	and	
compulsory	 superfund	 participation	 in	 Australia	
since	1992.	
DC Frog-to-Prince Transformation Principles 
The	Lifecycle	Theory	of	Personal	Finance	provides	
a	 clear	 blueprint	 for	 the	 design	 of	 any	 functional	
pension	formula:	
 Decide	 initial	 post-work	 standard-of-living	
pension	target	
 Make	 initial	 projections/assumptions	 about	
working	life	length	and	income,	longevity,	real	
return	term	structure,	age-based	risk	tolerance	
 Understand	 risk	 pooling	 opportunities	 for	 real	
investment	risk	and	longevity	risk		
 Decide	 initial	 savings	 rate/pattern	 and										
investment	policy		
 Make	 life-course	 adjustment	 decisions	 about	
the	 pension	 target	 and	projections/assumptions	
with	the	passage	of	time	and	experience	
These	 key	 pension	 formula	 design	 elements	 define	
the	 role	 and	 functions	 of	 the	 pension	 delivery						
organization:	
 Facilitate	plan	members	making	pension	target	
decisions	and	decide	on	default	 target	on	 their	
behalf
 Facilitate	plan	members	making	initial	assump-
tions	 about	 working	 life	 length	 and	 income,	
longevity,	 real	 return	 term	 structure,	 risk-
tolerance	 and	 decide	 on	 default	 responses	 on	
their	behalf	
 Create	 and	 implement	 transparent,	 fair	 plan	
member	 risk	 pooling	 opportunities	 for	 real			
investment	risk	and	longevity	risk	
 Facilitate	 plan	 members	 making	 the	 initial				
savings	 rate/pattern	 and	 investment	 policy				
decisions	 and	 decide	 on	 default	 responses	 on	
their	behalf	
 Facilitate	 plan	 members	 making	 life-course	
adjustment	 decisions	 about	 the	 pension	 target	
and	 projections/assumptions	 with	 the	 passage	
of	 time	 and	 experience,	 and	decide	on	mecha-
nisms	 required	 to	make	 thoughtful,	 defensible	
default	responses	on	their	behalf	
 Create	 and	 manage	 an	 organization	 with	 the	
requisite	 authority,	 scale,	 skills,	 infrastructure,	
and	aligned	interests	to	support	the	tasks	set	out	
above	in	a	cost-effective	manner	
Of	 course	 saying	 is	 one	 thing,	 doing	 another.	 We	
now	turn	to	the	case	study	of	a	pension	organization	
that	has	made	the	strategic	decision	to	base	 its	plan	
member	 services	 offering	 directly	 on	 the	 design	
blueprint	set	out	above.			
						
From Principles to Practices: the Case of QSUPER 
QSUPER	 provides	 pension	 services	 to	 540,000			
public	 sector	 employees	 and	 retirees	 in	 Australia’s	
State	of	Queensland.	It	has	about	$30B	in	assets	and	
employs	600	people.	Here	is	a	summary	of	a	recent	
QSUPER	 presentation	 setting	 out	 a	 number	 of					
important	strategic	decisions	 taken	by	the	organiza-
tion,	 their	 rationale,	 and	 their	 implementation						
implications:	
 Australian	 super	 funds	 have	 historically	 had	
virtually	identical,	unchanging	default	options	
and	strategies	for	its	DC	members				
 This	 is	 so	 despite	 significant	 market												
disruptions,	 changes	 in	 the	 socio-political			
environment,	changes	in	required	contribution	
rates,	 and	 important	 developments	 in	 the					
theory	 and	 implementation	 of	 pension	 design	
and	 delivery	 systems	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	
last	decade	
 These	 observations	 raise	 an	 important						
question:	 are	 the	 trustees	 of	 Australian	 super	
funds	acting	 in	 the	best	 interests	of	 their	plan	
members?	
 In	 QSUPER’s	 view,	 there	 is	 currently	 too	
much	 emphasis	 on	 peer-relative	 performance,	
and	not	enough	on	the	financial	well-being	of	
plan	members.	
 As	 a	 result,	QSUPER	 is	 taking	 the	 following	
steps	in	the	management	of	its	default	option:	
1.	 Cease	 participation	 in	 super	 industry	 peer	
surveys,	 2.	 Redefine	 its	 fundamental	 goal	 as	
delivering	a	target	pension	to	plan	members	at	
a	 target	 age,	 3.	 Segment	 plan	 members	 into	
age/account	size-based	cohorts,	4.	Restructure	
financial	 decisions	 around	 relationship							
between	 actual	 member	 balances	 today,	 and	
the	‘target’	balance	required	to	be	‘on	track’	to	
deliver	 the	 ultimate	 target	 pension,	 5.	 Reor-
ganize	 the	 investment	 function	 into	 ‘return-
seeking’	 and	 ‘target	 pension-hedging’							
components.	
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 In	 a	 longer-term	 timeframe,	 QSUPER	 will	
also	 research	 the	 provision	 of	 member								
annuitization	 options,	 and	 restructure	 its		
member	counselling	and	reporting	services	so	
that	 they	 directly	 align	 with	 the	 strategic					
decisions	summarized	above.				
It	would	seem	QSUPER	is	taking	the	lessons	of	the	
Life	 Cycle	 Theory	 of	 Personal	 Finance	 and	 its					
organizational	 implementation	 implications	 very	
seriously.	
“DBization” 
The	 importance	of	 the	change	of	direction	 in	 client	
needs	 logic	 and	 its	 implementation	 consequences	
should	not	be	underestimated.	The	traditional	‘frog’	
DC	model	simply	accumulates	financial	capital	with	
no	 particular	 goal	 in	 mind.	 The	 wildly	 popular	
‘target	date	fund’	(TDF)	innovation	does	not	change	
this	 fundamental	 reality,	 as	 it	 simply	 introduces	 an	
age-based	 equity	 exposure	 rule	 into	 the	 mix.	 The	
game	 changer	 is	 the	 shift	 to	 a	 target	 pension	 by	 a	
target	 date.	 In	 their	 book	 “The	 Retirement	 Plan				
Solution:	 The	 Reinvention	 of	 Defined																	
Contribution”	(Wiley	2009),	Ezra,	Collie,	and	Smith	
call	this	the	“DBization	of	DC”.
In	 their	 article	 “What	 DC	 Plan	 Members	 Really	
Want”	(RIJPM,	Fall	2011),	Tretiakova	and	Yamada	
explore	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 DBization	 of	 DC.	
They	begin	by	noting	that	even	near-dated	TDFs	had	
average	returns	close	to	-25%	in	2008,	with	individ-
ual	returns	for	individual	products	ranging	from	-4%	
to	-41%.	From	there,	 they	go	on	to	demonstrate	the	
benefits	of	implementing	what	they	call	a	“dynamic	
glide	 path	 strategy”.	 Such	 a	 strategy	 focuses	 on			
producing	a	target	pension	(e.g.,	70%	of	final	salary)	
by	 a	 target	 date.	 The	 essence	 of	 the	 strategy	 is	 to	
regularly	compare	actual	member	balances	along	the	
glide	 path	 to	 a	 target	 balance	 calculated	 with	 the		
final	target	pension	destination	in	mind.		
In	 their	 simulations,	 the	 authors	 introduce	 a	 rule	 to	
reduce	investment	risk	if	the	actual	balance	exceeds	
the	target	balance,	and	to	increase	risk	if	it	is	below	
the	 target.	 They	 test	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	 rule	 using	
both	long	term	historical	data	and	simulated	possible	
futures	 based	 on	 long	 term	 history,	 and	 on	 the						
specific	 2000-2010	 experience.	 Alternative						
benchmark	 strategies	 include	 100%	 equities,	 100%	
bonds,	 a	 fixed	 60-40	mix,	 and	 a	 typical	TDF	 fixed	
glide	path.	They	find	their	dynamic	glide	path	strate-
gy	produces	better	 results	 than	 the	alternatives.	For	
example,	 the	 typical	TDF	hits	 the	 target	balance	on	
the	target	date	only	52%	of	the	time	versus	97%	for	
the	dynamic	glide	path	strategy	in	their	simulations.	
An	 important	 note	 here	 is	 that	 in	 their	 simulations,	
Tretiakova	 and	 Yamada	 only	 used	 the	 investment	
policy	 lever	 to	make	 glide	 path	 course	 corrections.	
In	 practice,	 other	 levers	 (e.g.,	 contribution	 rate	
changes,	retirement	date	changes)	are	also	available.	
All	this	points	to	the	urgency	of	getting	the	design	of	
the	default	option	right,	as	well	as	the	design	of	the	
plan	member-pension	organization	interface.		
Really Understanding Plan Members’ Post-Work 
Wants and Needs 
In	 his	 article	 “How	 Should	 Retirees	 Manage								
Investment	 and	 Longevity	 Risk?”	 (RIJPM,	 Spring	
2011),	Ezra	 offers	 interesting	 perspectives	 on	 these	
post-work	 design	 questions.	 He	 makes	 three									
important	points:	
1.	 Help	 members	 convert	 post-work	 needs	 and	
aspirations	 into	 consistent	 financial	 implica-
tions:	 a	 feasible	 spending/bequest	 policy,	 a	
cost-effective	longevity	protection	policy,	and	
a	 financial	 balance	 target	 at	 retirement							
consistent	with	achieving	these	goals.	
2.	 Help	members	 understand	 that	 longevity	 risk	
increases	 with	 age:	 though	 it	 might	 seem	
counterintuitive,	 the	 older	 one	 gets,	 the	more	
longevity	 risk	 dominates	 investment	 risk.	 For	
example,	 for	 a	male	 aged	 75,	 Ezra	 calculates	
that	 longevity	 risk	 is	greater	 than	 investing	 in	
a	100%	equity	portfolio.			
3.	 Separate	 the	 investment	 and	 longevity	 risk	
mitigation	decisions:	lifetime	income	annuities	
are	 unpopular	 because	 they	 are	 inflexible	
blends	 of	 fixed	 income	 and	 insurance							
products.	Two	practical	ways	to	separate	them	
are	 to	 (a)	 spend	 about	 15%	 of	 the	 member		
financial	balance	at	retirement	(e.g.,	age	65)	to	
buy	 an	 advanced	 life	 deferred	 annuity	 that	
would	 commence	 if	 the	member	 outlives	 his/
her	 life	 expectancy	 (e.g.,	 age	 85),	 or	 (b)						
purchase	a	 lifetime	withdrawal	guarantee	 that	
ensures	 monthly	 payments	 (subject	 to	 some	
maximum)	 continue	 even	 after	 the	member’s	
balance	has	been	exhausted.	
The	major	point	is	that	21st	Century	DC-driven	plans	
don’t	 just	 have	 intelligent	 asset	 accumulation							
designs.	 Their	 asset	 decumulation	 designs	 must			
receive	an	equal	share	of	innovative	thinking.		
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Institutional Implications 
Predictably,	 Senator	 Harkin’s	 call	 for	 the	 develop-
ment	of	a	coherent,	cost-effective,	universal	plan	to	
cover	US	workers	without	 employer-based	pension	
plans	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 USA Retirement Funds 
has	 not	 be	 welcomed	 with	 universal	 acclaim.	 A	
spokesperson	 for	 the	 right-wing	 Heritage										
Foundation	commented	“...The	problems	we’ve	got	
with	 the	 plan	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appears	 the			
Senator	is	creating	a	large	central	pension	plan	that	
will	compete	with	many	of	the	existing	plans...”.	In	
the	UK,	the	NEST initiative	continues	to	face	similar	
criticism.	 In	 Canada,	 Finance	 Minister	 Flaherty			
rejected	 our	 Canada Supplementary Pension Plan
proposal	 for	 apparently	 similar	 anti-competitive		
reasons,	and	has	countered	with	a	Pooled Registered 
Pension Plan proposal	to	be	delivered	by	the	private	
sector.	 In	Australia,	 the	 Cooper	 Review	 has	 called	
for	a	transition	to	fewer,	larger,	more	cost-effective,	
member-responsive	super	funds.	
We	 mention	 these	 initiatives	 because	 pension						
delivery	is	as	important	as	pension	design.	The	best	
pension	designs	 in	 the	world	go	for	naught	without	
interest-aligned,	right-scaled,	expert,	motivated,	cost
-effective	pension	institutions	to	deliver	them.	Such	
institutions	 understand	 what	 their	 members/clients	
want,	and	have	clear	mandates	to	design	and	imple-
ment	 the	 services	 needed	 to	 satisfy	 those	 wants.	
Should	 such	 institutions	 operate	 in	 a	 competitive	
environment?	Of	 course	 they	 should.	But	 it	 should	
be	a	competitive	environment	shaped	by	 the	reality	
of	the	profound	informational	asymmetry	that	exists	
in	 the	market	 for	 pension	 and	 investment	 services.	
Sellers	know	a	great	deal	more	about	what	they	are	
selling	 than	 buyers	 know	 about	 they	 are	 	 buying.	
Without	intervention,	that	asymmetry					predictably	
leads	 to	 customers	 paying	 too	 much	 for	 too	 little,	
and	service	providers	earning	too	much	for	too	little.	
In	stronger	words,	it	leads	to	market					failure.	
There	are	only	two	(not	mutually	exclusive)	paths	to	
solving	the	market	failure	problem.	One	is	to	foster	
the	 creation	 of	more	well-governed,	 co-op	 pension	
institutions	 (e.g.,	 like	 the	 QSUPER	 organization	
featured	 in	 this	 Letter).	 The	 other	 is	 to	 create									
far-stronger,	 smarter	 regulatory	 institutions	 that		
understand	 the	 asymmetry	 problem,	 and	 that								
proactively	 and	 aggressively	 protect	 customer					
interests	 by	 only	 licensing	 pension	 institutions	 that	
can	demonstrate	the	delivery	of	customer	value	at	a	
reasonable	cost.										


The Finnish Centre for Pensions is a statutory co-operation body, expert and 
producer of joint services for the development and implementation of earnings-
related pension provision.
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